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### 1

#### Interpretation – “economic engagement” is an iterated process across multiple areas to influence state behavior – only trade and aid are topical-fx

Resnick 1 – Dr. Evan Resnick, Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yeshiva University, “Defining Engagement”, Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 54(2), Ebsco

A REFINED DEFINITION OF ENGAGEMENT In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes, I propose that we define engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include: DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport, artistic and academic exchanges (n25) Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence, culminating in the endpoint of "normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains. Engagement is a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship), engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third, the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement. This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends, does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.

#### Violation – theyre not

#### That’s a voting issue –

#### a) Predictable limits – they explode the topic which overstretches the research burden and incentivizes a shift to generics – hurts critical thinking and produces stale strategizing, hurting research skills. That prevents rigorous testing of the aff which hurts advocacy construction.

#### b) Ground – they bypass topic offense based on commodity trading, diplomatic agreements, and investment DAs like SOI. Non-trade affs steal international CP ground which is key to testing federal action on an international topic.

#### Default to competing interpretations – most objective.

### 2

#### The plan pumps Cuba with cash from nickel—causes a China-Russia-Cuba alliance

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A decorated Navy veteran, Brookes served on active duty in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East in aviation and intelligence billets, Brookes, now a retired Navy commander, served as a reservist with the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Naval Intelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Vice President, Brookes is pursuing a doctorate at Georgetown University. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (B.S.); the Defense Language Institute (Russian); the Naval War College; and the Johns Hopkins University (M.A.). He also has taught at the National Defense University and studied German and Polish, National Security Affairs, “Keep the Embargo, O” http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o)

Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already.¶ The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)¶ With an influx of resources, the Cuban regime would surely team up with the rulers of nations like Venezuela, Nicaragua and Bolivia to advance socialism and anti-Americanism in the Western Hemisphere.¶ The embargo has stifled Havana's ambitions ever since the Castros lost their Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s. Anyone noticed the lack of trouble Cuba has caused internationally since then? Contrast that with the 1980s some time.¶ Regrettably, 110 years after independence from Spain (courtesy of Uncle Sam), Cuba still isn't free. Instead of utopia, it has become a dystopia at the hands of the Castro brothers.¶ The US embargo remains a matter of principle -- and an appropriate response to Cuba's brutal repression of its people. Giving in to evil only begets more of it. Haven't we learned that yet?¶ Until we see progress in loosing the Cuban people from the yoke of the communist regime, we should hold firm onto the leverage the embargo provides.

**That alliance causes nuclear and biological war**

**Gussack 7** (September, Nevin, Guest Writer for THE CENTER FOR INTELLIGENCE STUDIES a non-partisan public policy institution dedicated to the research and dissemination of substantive information regarding the threat posed by foreign intelligence services to the United States, http://www.centerforintelligencestudies.org/OC\_RedDawn.html, “RED DAWN IN RETROSPECT:

COMMUNIST PLANS OF CONQUEST DURING THE COLD WAR”, nkj)

Note: The “Main Enemy” means the US

Executive Summary: Since the dawn of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, international communism sought to cripple capitalism and the liberal democracies through **indirect subversion**, encirclement, and if necessary outright military conquest. The Western response had combined mixed levels of military preparedness and appeasement in their foreign and security policies towards the communist world. Our public knowledge of communist subversion and military intentions has been shaped by the majority of print and media sources and academia. These institutions provided gross misinterpretations or inaccuracies due to leftist or “anti-Cold War” biases. This reality was the result of the penetration of New Left worldviews and personalities into the opinion molding centers of power. Many American based multinational corporations also permeated the debate with views that accommodation and trade would mellow the juggernaut of communist military power. More than a few of these titans of the business world also supported the communist states as models of efficient new societies. Hence, popular knowledge of communist plans of aggression had proven to be vastly distorted by the media and even government agencies under the influence of the Left and big business. This essay will document the history of communist invasion planning in Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Flexible utilization of nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional war tactics characterized the communist effort to pulverize the Main Enemy. Also discussed is the ultimate goal of the occupation and communization of the territories under attack. The documented evidence will explain how collaborationists would then seize power in the targeted nations. This essay will prove to be especially relevant in the contemporary political discourse, where many pundits and politicians trumpet the notion that “communism is dead” and “China is becoming capitalist.” However, current Chinese and Russian military plans, along with their truculent statements and exercises necessitate a comprehension of the recent Cold War past. China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba remain communist states and committed to the eventual destruction of capitalism. Meanwhile, the Russian Federation and some Eastern European countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Romania, Czech Republic) have “ex-communist” apparatchiks still holding influential levers of power in the business and intelligence fields. Hence it is important for the believers and doubters of my thesis to reflect deeply on the wise words of George Santayana: “He who does not learn from history is doomed to repeat it.”

One of the most derided assertions concerning Soviet intentions during the Cold War was their drive for ultimate conquest of the United States and non-communist world. Such derision and hostility towards the notion of a Soviet long range plan for world conquest emanated from prominent academics, businessmen, and politicians in the Free World. Such forces of appeasement castigated the notion of the Soviets possessing a desire for world control/domination. However, the available anecdotal and primary source evidence indicates that the Soviets and their allies consistently cooperated in the final goal of the crippling and ultimately defeating the United States and its allies in Europe and the Third World. Open warfare would be considered one of many options for this long-range plan.

The communist world adopted a flexible strategic and tactical approach in their military plans for the subjugation of the non-communist world. The available evidence points to the following characteristics of their military program: 1) Employment of encirclement of the United States and other Free World nations by unfriendly communist governments 2) Utilization of special operations forces, intelligence services, and proxy terrorists/CPs to create disruption and assassinate prominent VIPs in the target countries 3) Usage of chemical-biological, atomic, and conventional armaments to remove the command and control, key industries, and intercontinental military assets in NATO and in CONUS 4) Utilizing communist regional powers, such as Vietnam and Cuba, to impose Marxism Leninism in their respective regions. The elements of surprise and maximum force for points 2, 3, and 4 were to be critical in the Soviet’s success on the battlefield. Thus, the Red Dawn Scenario is completed, with the triumph of global communist totalitarianism. In this essay, we will discuss the various encirclement and occupation plans with information gleaned from scholars, defectors, and primary source documents.

Soviet war plans against NATO and CONUS could be traced as far back as the early 1950s when Stalin was the supreme General Secretary of the CPSU and Premier of the USSR. Karel Kaplan was a chief archivist for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz) until his defection to the West in 1968. Kaplan provided information concerning a meeting that Stalin had with Soviet armed forces generals and their counterparts in satellite states of Europe. Alexej Cepicka, the Czech Minister of Defense provided this scenario, as paraphrased by Kaplan:

After a report by representatives of the bloc about the condition of their respective armies, Stalin took the floor to elaborate on the idea of the military occupation of the whole of Europe, insisting on the necessity of preparing it very well. Since the Korean War had demonstrated the military weakness of the United States, despite its use of highly advanced technology, it seemed appropriate to Stalin to take advantage of this in Europe. He developed arguments in support of the following thesis: `No European army is in a position to seriously oppose the Soviet army and it can even be anticipated that there will be no resistance at all. The current military power of the United States is not very great. For the time being, the Soviet camp therefore enjoys a distinct superiority. But this is merely temporary, for some three or four years. Afterward, the United States will have at its disposal means for transporting reinforcements to Western Europe and will also be able to take advantage of its atomic superiority. Consequently, it will be necessary to make use of this brief interval to systematically prepare our armies by mobilizing all our economic, political, and human resources. During the forthcoming three or four years, all of our domestic and international policies will be subordinated to this goal. Only the total mobilization of our resources will allow us to grasp this unique opportunity to extend socialism throughout the whole of Europe.

In this scenario, the elements of surprise, total mobilization, and the strength of the conventional forces would be used to achieve a victory for “socialism” in Europe. These assets of the communists would theoretically compensate for their comparative weaknesses in naval and atomic power that was possessed by the USA.

Another Czech Army colonel who defected to the West testified under the pseudonym Jan Bukar to the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) about Stalin’s war and occupation plans against Europe. Such objectives were to be achieved by 1955. While enrolled at the Frunze Military Academy in the Soviet Union, Bukar learned that the USA would be “the theater of future military operations.” He was taught by Soviet experts on the topography and geography of the United States and was informed that Alaska would be re-absorbed into the USSR. Bukar and 3,000 other Soviet and European satellite officers were all privy to these plans of the future conquest of the United States and Europe.

Evidence of communist long-range plans also surfaced during the period of Stalin’s influence over the international communist movement. One such long-range plan entailed the isolation of the United States by detaching her European allies and fomenting revolution in the Third World nations and Europe’s colonies. Communism would then sweep the Third World and revolution would sweep Europe, thus depriving the West of valuable resources for its economy. Europe and United States, cut off from their resource base, would be plunged into revolution. Stalin himself viewed the outlying colonies of the West as the “rear” of “imperialism. In an interview with a Japanese journalist, later printed in his Works, Stalin clearly stated:

Do I not think that the growth of the revolutionary movement in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other Eastern countries is a sign that the time is drawing near when the Western powers will bury themselves in the grave they have dug for themselves in the East? Yes, I do. The colonial countries constitute the principal rear of imperialism. The revolutionisation of this rear is bound to undermine imperialism not only in the sense that imperialism will be deprived of its rear, but also in the sense that the revolutionisation of the East is bound to give a powerful impulse to the intensification of the revolutionary crisis in the West. Attacked on two sides -- in the rear as well as in front -- imperialism will be forced to admit that it is doomed.

Utilizing this strategy, Mao Tse Tung drew up such a plan for the encirclement of the capitalist world and sent Foreign Minister Chou En Lai in March 1953 to Moscow to submit this document to their Soviet allies. This plan, the Memorandum on New Program for World Revolution, entailed the following steps: 1) Separate the USA from Japan, France, and Britain by playing on war weariness and the benefits of trade with the USSR. 2) Conquest of the Republic of China (ROC-Taiwan) 3) Revolution of Indochina by the Viet Minh to be completed in two-year period. 4) Fall of Burma, then Thailand, and Indonesia. Withdrawal of all British colonial forces from East Asia by 1960. 5) Combined military and industrial power of the USSR and China would force “ruling clique” in Japan to collapse. A "peaceful evolution” would then occur, bringing to power a communist government in Tokyo. 6) India, at that time, was considered a “friend” of China and the Soviet Union. 7) A “peace offensive” would be launched throughout the planning period of the World Revolution. 8) The Philippines and the Arab world would then become communist through “economic cooperation, alliances, united fronts, and coalitions” by 1965. 9) Africa would be plunged into revolution, forcing “the imperialist and the colonizationists” to be “quickly driven into the sea.” 10) Europe would then be disconnected from her colonies in the Third World, with a “total economic collapse” occurring. 11) The USA, Canada, and South America would then be isolated. Mao expected that if the USA were to commence a war, the “courses of action” are then outlined in the “memorandum for military aid.”

It is worthy to note that this ominous document was published in the Congressional Record on April 29, 1954 by California Republican Senator Knowland. Mao Tse Tung was known to expound upon his desire to conquer the globe for communism in conversations with generals, admirals, and officials on other occasions. On June 28, 1958 Mao informed his generals and admirals that “Now the Pacific Ocean is not peaceful. It can only be peaceful when we take it over.” Lin Biao then added “We must build big ships, and be prepared to land in Japan, the Philippines, and San Francisco.” Late in 1958, Mao stated to his provincial chiefs that: “In the future we will set up the Earth Control Committee, and make a uniform plan for the Earth.”

After Stalin’s death, the Soviet leadership continued to couple military plans against the capitalist world with their long-range plans of encirclement. These military plans contained massive usage of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons on strategic NATO military, political, and economic targets in Europe. This aggression would occur in tandem with a massive infantry, airborne, and armored Warsaw Pact invasion. Such an assault would be presaged by sabotage by communist agents and special operations forces against key VIPs and installations. The initial CBW, atomic, and conventional assault would be conducted in a blitzkrieg fashion, modeled after the Wehrmacht and Nazi military units during World War II. A document produced in the wake of the Warsaw Pact exercise Soyuz-83 and issued by the East German Defense Council highlighted this strategy of lightning speed:

The strategic groupings of troops and naval forces of the armed forces of the USSR, the Poland People’s Republic, the GDR, and the CSSR have the following mission: The principal aim of the first strategic operation with troops on four Fronts is a rapid advance, reaching the frontiers of France by the 13th or 15th day, and thereby:

\* taking the territories of Denmark, the FRG, the Netherlands, and Belgium;

\* forcing the withdrawal of these West European countries from the war; and

\*continuing the strategic operation by establishing two additional Fronts inside France, shattering the strategic reserves on French territory, and reaching Vizcaya and the

Spanish border by day 30 or 35, thus accomplishing the final aims of the first strategic operation by removing France from the war.”

In 1988-1989, the advanced course for the senior officer corps of the East German Army in which the “instructions of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pact’s Joint Armed Forces regarding the operational mission of troops and naval forces” laid out that: The goal of the operation is to liberate the territories of the GDR and CSSR, to occupy the economically important regions of the FRG east of the Rhine, and to create the right circumstances for a transition to a general offensive aimed at bringing about the withdrawal of the European NATO states from the war.

The exercise “Staff Training 89” called for the utilization of 76 nuclear weapons, some of which having a high yield in the West German provinces of Schleswig-Holstein. Another purpose of this usage of mass destruction weapons was also to induce panic and disorder in the Western democracies. This would thus have the effect of weakening the resistance of the Free World and the cohesion of the NATO allies. As one document stated:

“It is desirable to consider (...) nuclear attacks on such centers as Hannover or Brunswick, Kiel and Bremen. The destruction of these cities will likely cause a complete disorganization of political life, the economy, etc. It will significantly influence the creation of panic in areas of nuclear strikes. The exploitation of the effects of strikes by our propaganda may contribute to the spread of panic among enemy armies and populations (...). In order to exclude Denmark from the war as quickly as possible, nuclear strikes should be launched at Esbjerg (an important strategic point in the NATO system) and Roskilde (Zealand Island), and subsequently a widespread special propaganda action aimed at deepening the existing panic should be conducted to warn Denmark's troops and civilian population of the consequences of further resistance and the threat that, in the event of continuation of the war, further atomic strikes will occur. (Excerpt from a presentation by the commander of the Polish Front, General Zygmunt Duszynski, in 1961)

Even during the so-called “fall of communism,” Warsaw Pact military plans and aggressive exercises continued. The Agence France Presse reported in 1991 that “as late as June 1990, eight months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the NVA's (Nationale Volksarmee/National People’s Army of East Germany) 5th Army carried out joint exercises with the Soviet military that still rehearsed for a westward offensive in northern Germany. The plan involved the use of chemical weapons and up to 87 nuclear warheads. And a similar war game involving Soviet and East German generals was planned for September, less than a month before German unification. Major American newspapers also reported that despite the “fall of communism” and withdrawal of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990, the USSR retained large arms, fuel, and ammunition dumps in the region. It also became known that the USSR retained in violation of the 1987 INF Treaty SS-23 nuclear missiles in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. In 1990, media reports indicated that the East Germans retained chemical weapons stockpiles. This information alone should force Cold War historians to honestly reappraise the Gorbachev period and highlight his continued commitment to world communism. The available evidence indicated that under the late Gorbachev period, Soviet war preparations for Western Europe did not abate in any sense. They only assumed a deceptive stance to anesthetize Western opinion and further achieve an element of surprise.

The occupation of the NATO and non-communist countries in Europe would involve the following known factors: 1) A flood of propaganda to convince the Europeans of the just cause of the communist invasion 2) Introduction of the mechanisms of a planned socialist economy through currency revisions, rationing, and control of reconstructed industrial plants 3) Usage of collaborators as puppet rulers of the subject populations 4) Mass internment and executions of “class enemies” 5) Administration of occupied territories by Soviet and Warsaw Pact military commanders.

An East German defector from their National People’s Army (NVA), Captain Guenter Alfons Malikowski of the First Armored Division, revealed documents in 1960 outlining Warsaw Pact war plans against the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG-West Germany). One of the documents was a proclamation to residents of occupied Kiel to cooperate with the “liberating” East German occupying forces. One proclamation exhorted: “The last pockets of resistance in the city have been wiped out. The city is in the hands of the troops of the National People’s Army of the German Democratic Republic. The army of the first workers’ and farmers’ state in Germany has not come as a occupation army to tyrannize over the working people. We have come to do away with fascism and militarism in Germany once and for all. We seek the cooperation of the democratically minded and constructive forces of the city.”

A series of Czech documents entitled “Czechoslovak Drafts of Orders and Appeals to be Issued in Occupied Western European Territories,” dated June 29, 1964, is partially reprinted below:

“Order of the Commander of the Western Front Political Directorate of the Western Front Special Propaganda Department July 2, 1964 Re: Draft of Order of the Commander of the Western Front On Soldiers’ Conduct towards Population of the Liberated Territories and on Principles of Treatment of POWs Order of the Commander of the Western Front

Every Czechoslovak soldier must be aware of the fact that he is a soldier of a socialist army, which wages a just war for the defense of his socialist country. Our aim is not to subdue other nations, to seed fear and panic among the population, but to annihilate imperialism and to bring real freedom to the nations, which imperialism has brought into this hopeless war against us.

I order (therefore) all members of the Czechoslovak People’s Army fighting on enemy territory: To maintain the basic principles of socialist humanism, as well as the internationally valid practices stipulated by the Geneva Convention, to maintain humanitarian treatment of those who do not take a direct part in combat actions and of those who lay down their arms or have been neutralized in the fight by illness or injuries, as well as to comply with the demands of human dignity.

1. To maintain extraordinary vigilance and alertness, to intervene severely against those soldiers who would trespass it. To impede the activities of revanchist elements and their attempts to destroy objects of military significance and to wage espionage activities. Not to accept anything from the population, in particular food, drink, etc. To detain, disarm and hand over to the nearest commander anybody who has been caught committing hostile acts. To intervene immediately and in a radical way against elements caught conducting hostile acts who do not cease their resistance. To treat citizens who do not directly participate in hostile actions in the spirit of the basic principles of human morality, disregarding their statehood, political convictions and property. Commanding officers shall take measures to avoid incorrect emotional and other reactions towards their subordinates. They will intervene as severely as possible against those who have denigrated the personal dignity of people, who willfully steal or damage their property or threaten the health and life of the people.

The advantages of POW status shall not be extended to terrorist guerrillas or a hostile population who, despite appeals of our bodies, secretly hide and bear arms, while fighting us unlawfully, deceitfully attacking and murdering our soldiers.

Safe Conduct, i.e., Surrender Pass for NATO soldiers (English Version)

The NATO soldier who carries this laissez-passer is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible. This holds good for a group of soldiers as well.

Appeal to French Soldiers French Soldier! Liberated France, the France of tomorrow shall need you. Your family shall need you to take care of them, your children shall need you to bring them up, your parents shall need you to provide for their comfortable old age. Your country shall need you to give her the strength of your hands, your mind, to make her recover her grandeur and happiness. Do you want to sacrifice your life, which is so badly needed, to the war for German interests? French soldier! Give up fighting, save yourself for France. Whom Shall Your Death Help? This war, into which Americans and Germans have drawn your country, is not your war. It is the war of North American monopolies, which attempt to subdue the whole world under them. But what can the war bring you? The Polish Army was delegated with the following tasks in their occupation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG-West Germany): The Surrender of Hannover according to the Polish Army’s “Bison” Exercise (April 21–28, 1971) Due to the capitulation of the Hannover garrison, the Command of the Front has decided to provide assistance to the 5th Army by restoring the city to full function. For this reason, for the disposition of the command of the 5th Army, we direct: – one military police company from the NVA; – one company for the protection of public order from the Army Security Service; – a group of civilian party aktiv members from the SED (20 members); – a group of press and radio journalists from the GDR (8); – specialists in typography and radiophony (12); – part of a front group to secure special propaganda (24 officers, ensigns, and non-commissioned officers). The groups mentioned above will report for the disposition of the command of the 5th Army today at 6:00 p.m. In the following days the government of the GDR will direct other groups of specialists to the city of Hannover. Each time, the arrival of these groups will be signaled. Responsibilities of the 5th Army command include: a) to organize the Hannover Garrison Command and appoint one of the senior officers from the 6th Armored Division as commandant of the Garrison; b) to assign specified forces and equipment from the above-mentioned formations to the commandant of the Garrison. Simultaneously, with the support of democratic forces, to organize the regular police; c) to organize quick and efficient press and radio information for the people; d) to form a temporary camp for prisoners-of-war from the crew of the surrendered garrison; e) to provide full protection and defense for depots and storehouses (both civilian and military); f) to bring water-works, power plants, and heating plants into operation; g) to assist the leadership that is being organized with the distribution of foodstuffs from local supplies; h) to establish a united front municipal government recruited from activists from the KPD [German Communist Party] and the SPD [German Social Democratic Party]; i) as the removal of the ruins progresses, to bring industrial plants into production.

[…]

After a general assessment of the state of food reserves as well as the state of medical needs for civilians and prisoners, report specific requests to the staff of the Front by 11:00 a. m., April 29, 1971.

[Source: Collection Political Administration of the Military District of Silesia, File 152448/74/42. Archives of the Ground Forces, Wroclaw.” ]

The invasion and occupation plans for West Berlin and Germany were codenamed Operation Stoss and after 1987, Operation Zentrum. These operations would involve 32,000 Stasi, People’s Police, elite airborne units (e.g. Willi Sanger paratroop units) and regular East German and Soviet army units. It is also worth mentioning that the East Germans, like their Spetsnaz counterparts, had a special operations unit that dressed up in West German Bundeswehr uniforms and equipped with U.S. built M-48 tanks and M-113 APCs. This unit, which was subordinate to the Stasi, was to be used in deception and sabotage operations in the Federal Republic. The West German Communist Party (DKP) sent cadres to East Germany for military training in sabotage, industrial unrest, and protests during a Warsaw Pact invasion. West Germany would then be administered in its entirety by the East German Army, while an occupied Berlin would be divided into several zones. These zones would be administered by the East German and Soviet officials. "Besatzungsgeld" or occupation money would be printed for use by the occupying troops and the local population. Hence, the capitalist Deutschemark would be abolished in the FRG. Airports and rail stations would then be managed by previously trained experts from the East. The Stasi also reprinted new maps and signs for West German cities under occupation. For example, Koenigsallee, Duesseldorf's avenue of furs, jewels and designer fashions, was to be dubbed Karl Marx Allee. Special medals, known as the Bluecher Orders, were minted and stored for the eventual awarding to East German military officers and troops. Berlin’s city government would be overthrown and the Stasi would be tasked in purging political and other “class enemies.” These enemies would include anti-communists, businessmen, anti-leftists, civil servants, and police officials. The Stasi drew up such lists of specific individuals who were then to be dispatched to “internment camps.” The invasion of West Berlin would be known as Day X and would involve the Stasi and East German Army storming through 59 breaches in the Berlin Wall. All means of communications and transportation in Berlin would be captured and churches shut down. Economic assets and the means of communication would be harnessed by the occupying East German forces. Berlin would be administered by 12 neighborhood administrative offices, according to a document drawn up for the head of the Stasi Erich Mielke. The document itself was drawn up by the District Leader of the Berlin Area of the Ministry of State Security, Lieutenant-General Wolfgang Schwanitz. This plan for the occupation of West Berlin was in force as late as 1985, according to historian Dr. Otto Wenzel.

The Soviets also intended to occupy all of Western Europe, including Spain, France, Great Britain, and Portugal in their invasion, according to defecting Czech Major General Jan Sejna. Strategic targets in Britain, such as the London subways and water supply, were to be sabotaged. Interestingly, the British Parliament Buildings were to spared the effects of Soviet bombing runs. According to Sejna, the USSR reasoned that “we could make it inoperative through other means.” Other industrial and military targets would be destroyed by the special forces of the communists. A Soviet occupation force and/or a “progressive” British government would then “settle accounts with the bourgeois leaders.” In the spring of 1964, KGB Chairman Aleksandr Shelepin gave Czech Communist leader Antonin Novotny a list of potentially hostile British leaders in business, politics, and the police/army. They consisted of leaders of most major political parties and the section on the Conservative Party went down to the constituency level. The lists were compiled by the KGB and the British Communist Party and were replete with biographical notes and a recommendation of judicial action. These unfortunate British VIPs would either be detained or executed without trial. The most prominent leaders, such as Edward Heath, Sir Alex Douglas-Home, and Harold Wilson were to undergo show trials before their execution.

The French Army was expected to collapse and the fall of France would be accomplished in two days. Sejna also stated that “ration cards, handbills, tickets, and signs” were printed for the occupation forces and local populations in Switzerland, France, and West Germany. Arrest lists consisting of 10,000 prominent West German public figures were also drawn up. The French list, according to Sejna, has tens of thousands of names, including legislators, businessmen, trade union leaders, journalists, military officers, police officials, and mayors. The invading troops would retain mobile courts to try and execute thousands of “war criminals.” Soviet officials will then resume full control of occupied France, with the Commander of the Trans-Carpathian Red Army divisions becoming its commandant.

Collaborators in the native Communist Parties would then assume power in the occupied territories of the former NATO countries. For example, Soviet Marshal Yakubovsky informed General Sejna that there were 4,000 Austrian collaborators that the USSR could count on to “round up undesirable civilians once the country was occupied.” Sejna also described in his book We Will Bury You how the Soviets would also occupy Switzerland through an invasion of armored and paratroop units. Key points in Switzerland were expected to be captured in Day 3 of a general Warsaw Pact blitz across Europe. Key cities Sweden was to be occupied within twenty four hours and paratroopers would seize ports and industrial plants intact for use by the invaders. Sejna stated that the Warsaw Pact believed that they could subdue Sweden in a total of one week, excepting residual guerrilla resistance. Finland, under the presidency of Urho Kekkonen, would be bound by a private agreement with the Soviets to support the Warsaw Pact forces. Soviet Marshal Grechko informed Sejna that Finland would declare itself a “non-belligerent” and turn over its ports and territory to the USSR armed forces. The Dutch armed forces were looked upon as a heavily penetrated and weak force, subject to disruption due to the unionization of its soldiers. The Soviets expected the Dutch forces to collapse and the government to declare its “neutrality.” The government would then prevent NATO from utilizing its ports and the USSR would occupy the country.

It also became known recently that maps of the Western European nations were produced by the Soviet Union and its successor, the Russian Federation, from 1950 to at least 1997. Such documents were significant for two reasons: 1) They proved Soviet long range military planning for aggression 2) Discredits the notion that Gorbachev and his successors as less dictatorial and aggressive in their intentions towards the capitalist world. It is highly intriguing that the “democratic” post-1991 Yeltsin government would produce such maps, while posing as a “kindler, gentler” Russia. The existence of maps dated after 1991 also suggests that the Russian Federation, under rule of “former” communists considered the Western world enemy nations and the continued target of invasion and occupation. Our intelligence services and diplomatic service need to analyze this piece of evidence and ascertain the level of continued hostile Russian Federation intentions towards the Western powers.

The British map-making firm, Landmark Information Group stated that these Soviet-produced maps “revealed the exact location and purpose of every structure of possible military importance. The firm says experts believe they were developed using aerial photos, satellite images, local knowledge and even spies. "’The Russians managed to map out 16,000 sq km of the UK, including 103 major UK towns and cities,’" says the firm.” These maps are highly detailed and in this author’s opinion, are comparative or superior to U. S. Geodetic and Survey Maps. These Soviet generated maps of Ireland, Sweden, and Britain included depths of waterways, roads, locations of facilities, and other militarily useful information. Militarily significant targets were color coded blue, while other installations were colored pink, brown, and black. In fact, John Davies, a British expert on Russian maps, said the maps left a "fascinating legacy" of the Soviet quest to become the dominant global political power. Mr. Davies stated further: "Realizing the military, economic and political benefits of topographic information, the Soviet military set about mapping the whole world -a mammoth task which took over 50 years before, during and after the Cold War to complete." Today, very little is known about how the organization was structured and how such incredible results were achieved. Certainly the operation was militarily-driven, very well controlled, achieving spectacular results.” The Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet published a Soviet made map dating from 1987. The accuracy and details of these maps worried the normally far left Swedish government, which was horrified at such proof that their country was a target of Soviet invasion. Pravda stated that:

The maps depicted the coast in the area of Stockholm and Karlskruna – the major army base of the Swedish Navy in the Baltic area. The detailed maps showed all defensive installations on the outskirts of the two cities, as well as the spots for landing commandos, and the depth of secret waterways. Swedish experts concluded that the Soviet Headquarters used those maps to organize an incursion in Sweden. The maps were of very high quality – better than the creations of best Swedish military mappers. As a result, the nation was so scared like never before, not even during the worst Cold War period. When Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson looked at the photographs, he said that the worst apprehension of those people, who considered Moscow a source of direct danger, was verified. The prime minister also said that after the documents are studied in detailed, the Swedish government will decide, if it is worth making a protest against Russia or not.

The post-Stalin generation of Soviet and international communist leaders were also committed to a long range plan of military and political encirclement of CONUS and other key Free World nations with hostile revolutionary and communist satellites. General Jan Sejna was privy to such plans while serving in the highest ranks of the Czech Armed Forces (CSLA) and Party (CPCz) apparatus. According to Sejna, this strategic planning document was called “The Long Term Strategic Plan for the Next Ten to Fifteen Years and the Years After.” It outlined this policy of subversion, invasion, demoralization, and ultimate surrender of the democratic world in the face of the communist juggernaut. The section of the title “...and the Years After” indicated that the Warsaw Pact and their allies had a flexible strategy for the crippling of the capitalist world that fluctuated according to the prevailing political situations in the non-communist countries. The encirclement, invasion, and eventual surrender and occupation of the NATO countries and CONUS would be achieved during Phases Three and Four of the Plan. They were known as “The Period of Dynamic Social Change” and “The Era of Global Democratic Peace” and were supposed to be achieved by 1995. However, Sejna had indicated that Soviet long-range planning tactics and their timetables were subject to adjustment. However, their ultimate goal of “Global Democratic Peace” (i.e. Red Dawn) remained unchanged.

The battlegrounds of Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East had been the targets of aggression by the Soviets and their proxies, with the twin goals of geographically and economically encircling the United States. Encirclement of CONUS and NATO would occur through 1) communist usage of proxy terrorist revolutionary movements seizing power in Third World and allied countries having close geographic proximity to key non-communist nations and natural resources, i.e. the FMLN in El Salvador, PLO, ANC, Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), etc. 2) Outright foreign invasion by satellite states, in coordination with the USSR 3) Usage of special forces, party, and intelligence agents of Soviet aligned nations to sabotage and sow chaos in the Free World.

After the fall of Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam to the communists, a remarkable document surfaced in that region. It was revealed by a Viet Cong defector Nguyen Cong Hoan, who also served in the puppet National Assembly in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV). This document was entitled Vietnam-Southeast Asia and was circulated in June 1976, then withdrawn due to its sensitive nature. Tran Quynh, private secretary to Communist Politburo official Le Duan commented that this document called for “the liberation of Thailand will be next. It is a historical necessity and a responsibility of ours.” Clearly, the Vietnamese and their allies had the ultimate domination of the ASEAN nations and the eviction of remaining U.S. influence as a long-term goal. It is also worthy to note that in 1975, the North Vietnamese inherited a tremendous arsenal of weapons from the old ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) to supplement their communist manufactured weapons. Hence, the North Vietnamese had tremendous military might at that time to possibly carry out an invasion of Thailand if political conditions permitted.

South Korea was another target of encirclement, subversion, and aggression by the Soviet-Chinese ally of North Korea. One of the highest-ranking defectors from the North, Workers’ Party ideological chief Hwang Jang-yop, outlined this strategy in a 1997 press conference with the South Korean press:

One of the basic North Korean policies on the Republic of Korea, which has not changed over the past 50 years, is to force the collapse of the South internally. The second is to unify the country by arms. In the Workers Party alone, there are many departments that handle affairs of the South, such as the United Front Department and the Social and Cultural Department which are working openly and other departments that manage underground organizations. In addition, there is the operations department in charge of infiltration and a department that collects information. There are many departments.”

When asked about North Korea’s ability and determination to carry out a war with the South, Hwang responded:

It is a very tough question. That war will eventually inevitably break out, at some time, has become common knowledge (in the North). Since I am not the commander-in-chief, I can't know whether it will be an all-out war or a limited war. Presumably, however, it will be an all-out war. As for timing, all international and domestic conditions will be taken into consideration. I think it will occur when preparations for the internal collapse of the South and an armed invasion occur simultaneously. I presume that North Korea will provoke a war when the situation in the South becomes complicated or chaotic and when the South's allies are dividing their strength for events in other parts of the world.

Yossef Bodansky also revealed that North Korean special operations forces even probed America’s backyard in Mexico and Central America:

Meanwhile, the DPRK has been closely studying infiltration avenues and techniques into the U.S. since at least early 1983, when four small North Korean freighters escorted by several small trawlers, all fitted with a vast array of antennae and other ELINT equipment, were patrolling the Gulf of California and the shores of California and northern Mexico. Although the primary and original mission of this flotilla was to collect electronic intelligence and provide early-warning in case of a U.S. military intervention in Central America, the ships were well equipped to study, and possibly even conduct, insertion operations. The Korean crews were “soldiers or commandoes” also involved with Central American revolutionaries. Moreover, the DPRK freighters used in these operations were of the same type used for the clandestine insertion of DPRK Spetsnaz into hostile countries and supporting international terrorist activities.

Bodansky had also written that North Korean special operations forces also utilized Soviet and Eastern European style mock-up training facilities of South Korean cities:

The main intelligence school now has an 8km long “South Korean” city with restaurant, coffee shop, supermarket, stationary shop, etc. Despite the ideological threat, the school has a constant supply of the latest South Korean newspapers and movies. An Myong-Chin observed that the subway station and bus terminal, as well as some other key buildings, are identical to those of Seoul.Just how serious Pyongyang is about the imminence of hostilities and the key rôle of special operations in such a war can be learned from the training of the intelligence Spetsnaz forces. Most important is the infiltration training of operatives of the Operations Department which is conducted by the “715 Liaison Office”. This training includes actual penetrations into South Korea, through underground tunnels and other means. At times, the operatives stay a few kms south of the DMZ. An MyongChin reported that on several occasions he had penetrated more than 2km south of the DMZ in order to study and experiment with ROK and U.S. military procedures, examine the Spetsnaz troops’ ability to evade guards and patrols, and gain confidence.

North Korea’s propaganda and military strategies appeared to have at least some effect on South Korean morale. A Soviet document recounting a conversation between Gorbachev and Kim il Sung was most revealing and frank in its analysis of the decay of South Korean society. Kim il Sung bragged that: “There is a big movement in favor of socialism in the South, and work is underway to create a national front. One third of South Korean parliamentarians support the North. Unlike the recent past when Americans were perceived as liberators and supporters, now many, not to mention the students, speak against the American presence.”

Historian and journalist Isabella Ginor revealed evidence of the USSR’s intention to assist in an invasion and occupation of the State of Israel in 1967. Soviet truculence and hatred for the Jews and Israel was revealed when Red Army Marshal Grechko stated in 1963 “within 15 years the Israelis will be happy if we just permit them to live.” The SovietArab invasion and occupation of Israel would involve usage of naval landings, airborne reinforcements, and air support for ground operations. Ginor also revealed that Soviet Spetsnaz commandos were to be strategically situated to sabotage Israeli targets:

Well before 1967, Israel had been targeted by the KGB's Foreign Intelligence Directorate as a theater of operations during a larger East-West conflict. Preparations had been made there for parachuting at least diversionnye razvedyvatelnye gruppy (sabotage-intelligence groups) to destroy Israeli targets. During 1964-66, according to documents supplied by the defecting KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, Israel was one of the countries where caches of arms and radio equipment were prepositioned for such operations. Mitrokhin claims some of these were booby trapped and may be in place to this day. The direct involvement of Soviet personnel on Israeli soil, at least on a small scale, had thus already been considered and approved.”

The occupation plans for the Jewish State of Israel entailed the collaboration of its Arab population and the insertion of interpreters to work with the people: “As early as May 11, Soviet Arabic-language interpreters stationed in Egypt were summoned to the Soviet Embassy in Cairo. One of them later recounted to journalist Aleksandr Khaldeev that they were told war between Egypt and Israel was inevitable. Later they were taken to Alexandria and informed they would be posted to the Black Sea Fleet, now cruising off the Israeli shore. “One of the interpreters...said he knew for sure that we would be attached to a 'desant,' or landing force, that would be landing in Haifa [Israel's main commercial harbor and naval base] or slightly northward.” The interpreters were to handle liaison with Israel’s Arab population, who “ were longing for us.”

It is also more than likely that the PLO and associated terrorist splinters, along with the Soviet financed Communist Party of Israel (Rakah) would also provide personnel and collaborators in an occupied Israel.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had ambitious plans for their Afghan puppet communists in Kabul. The Soviet puppet People’s Democratic Party (PDPA) government in Afghanistan positioned itself very firmly in the Soviet military camp. This was most apparent when Afghan Minister of Defense Abdul Qader stated in 1982 that: “In the future the Afghan Army will play a significant role like that of the Cuban and Vietnamese Armies…not far away is the day when our army will become a strong and energetic army capable of defending peace and security not only in Afghanistan, but in the region as well.”

Hence, the Afghan soldiers of the PDPA communist dictatorship were designated as the new janissaries for the export of communism in the South Central Asian region.

The ruling communist FRELIMO movement in Mozambique, in cooperation with the communists of Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, planned to conquer the anti-communist dictatorship of President Hastings Banda of Malawi. President Banda was noted for its opposition to Soviet expansionism in Africa and at one time provided assistance to anti-communist rebels in Mozambique called RENAMO. The Mozambicans would then replace the Banda regime by Malawian communist exiles. According to captured documents, former Mozambican communist president Samora Machel recommended that:

Mozambique and Zimbabwe must bring into being a new force in Malawi. Banda is worn out. We must not allow South Africa to set the course in Malawi. We must not allow the English, Americans and the Federal Republic of Germany to choose the Malawi leaders. The Army knows how these things must be done...We can also organize a Malawi Liberation Front, equip ourselves and infiltrate into Malawi in order to destroy the bandits (the Renamo guerrillas) who are there. We may also define the targets for such a front for the liberation of Malawi.

Creation of a puppet force to “liberate” and govern Malawi appeared to be modeled after Soviet plans for Europe and the consequent installation of quisling regimes. According to the captured documents, Mozambicans residing in Malawi were also to be harnessed as a fifth column in the FRELIMO destabilization campaign against the Banda government: “'We know Malawi, because we have two million Mozambicans there. The Malawians are in our hands. We have Mozambicans inside the Army, the police, the Young Pioneers ,' he claims.” This again would follow the usual communist pattern of using native peoples (overseas Chinese, Russians, etc.) for subversive purposes.

The South Africans captured these documents when Mozambican communist dictator Samora Machel’s presidential aircraft crashed in 1986. The recovered documentation revealed the high level of coordination between FRELIMO, Zimbabwe, the Soviets, and the Cubans in planning their subversion and attack on Malawi, and provided important information concerning the military strategy and the equipment to be utilized. The South Africans revealed the following details:

Mr. Botha said it was not clear from the document who the full Mozambican delegation to the meeting was, but President Machel had clearly led the discussion and his Prime Minister, Mr. Mario Machungo, was present as well. The Zimbabwe delegation had been led by Mr. Emmerson Munangagwa, Minister of State Security. He had been accompanied by Zimbabwe's Ambassador to Mozambique, Mr. H.E. Mvundura (he was ordered to leave the meeting when the plot was discussed), Mr. E.R. Kadungure, Minister of State Defence, General Rex Nhongo, Army Commander, Air Marshal J. Tungamirai, Maj-Gen Maseko and Lt-Col Shumba, of the Zimbabwe National Army, and others. President Banda had been referred to as ''criminal'' in the talks. . .Malawi's police and defence force would be infiltrated and strategic bridges in the country would be destroyed along with other vital parts of its infrastructure. Malawi would be cut off from Tanzania and Zambia. It was made clear it was time President Banda should go, and that the Malawi army would be able to handle the situation. Russians and Cubans were involved in the joint Mozambican and Zimbabwean plot to overthrow the Malawi government militarily and politically. . . At the meeting, President Machel is recorded as having said he wanted to talk, at ease, with ''the military men'', and in the absence of Zimbabwe's Ambassador to Mozambique. . . Discussing the plan, President Machel, said the ''military men'' had to place ''allavailable means in Zambezia'', the province bordering Malawi. . . ''We have some special forces for special operations, we have about 41 MiG-21 (jet fighters) . . . [agency ellipses] the victory is being planned . . . [agency ellipses] it demands cold-bloodedness.'' The transport of troops and equipment of Zambezia and Tete provinces was discussed, with the vital role Zimbabwe's transport facilities would play here, and the organization of medical services and food. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who is mentioned briefly in the minutes, had not guaranteed the closing of his border with Malawi, and his ''answer was not satisfactory''. President Machel said ''we have been at this table with the Mozambicans, Cubans and Soviets since last Friday (10th October) and we said that we should go immediately to Zambezia''. President Machel also warned the meeting not to underestimate South Africa ''because it can transport armed bandits by sea, using submarines and ships . . . [agency ellipses] she is desperate because we uncovered Malawi.'' The vital information for logistical planning was still being awaited, but had in fact been expected in time for the meeting. President Machel said he wanted to transfer his MiG-21s from Maputo to Beira so they could depart from there. The MiG-17s would be going to Zambezia, together with (helicopter) gunships. Summing up the logistical planning and the cost of the operation, President Machel said ''we will be ready to act if we have all this. We must make sure that if Malawi diverts its goods to Tanzania we will destroy the bridges linking Malawi to Tanzania . . . [agency ellipses] they must be bridges which took four to five years to build. If the goods are diverted to Zambia, we will not destroy the Zambian bridges but we will destroy the Malawian bridges which provide access to the Kazangula/Botswana route and to South Africa. If we destroy the bridges to Tanzania and Zambia we will have Malawi in our hands…”He also said he did not want to provoke those who sided with Malawi . . . [agency ellipses] ''I don't want to increase enemies . . . [agency ellipses] I can't do that''. The military action had to be backed by political action and Malawi had to be persuaded to allow Zimbabwean troops to cross its territory into Zambezia. The people of Malawi had to be convinced the Mozambique and Zimbabwe forces were in ''solidarity'' with them and not their government. Mr. Munangagwa told President Machel, ''there is a force ready to go'', but that there were preparations that had to be jointly made with Zimbabwe. Problems with the transport of military hardware from Mozambique harbours were also raised. . .”

Perhaps the most threatening geographic situation to CONUS would be communist revolution sweeping up the Central American isthmus and Mexico. This situation would dramatically alter the world balance of power directly pose a military threat to the United States. Top Sandinista and Cuban policymakers clearly yearned for the revolutionary dominoes to fall in Latin America. Mexican nationalism and anti-Americanism appeared to be a valuable card the USSR and its allies would use to garner support for its Red Dawn scenario for CONUS. According to defecting Sandinista cadre Alberto Suhr, Nicaragua’s Interior Minister Tomas Borge stated their long term goals succinctly: “We have Nicaragua, soon we will have El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica and Mexico. One day, tomorrow or 15 years from now, we're going to take 5 to 10 million Mexicans and they're going to have one thing in mind -- cross the border, go into Dallas, go into Houston, go into New Mexico, go into San Diego, and each one has embedded in his mind the idea of killing 10 Americans.”

Another Sandinista defector, Major Roger Miranda, indicated that Sandinista military planning, even during the Gorbachev period, is implemented in coordination with the Soviet Union and Cuba. A Reader’s Digest article based on Miranda’s information indicated that:

“The peace plan is a weapon to eliminate the Contras," Ortega told the members. First, it should be used to influence the U.S. Congress to cut off funds for the Contras. Once that happened, the Contras would cease to exist. Then the Sandinistas would build active and reserve forces of 600,000 soldiers. By 1995 they would have received flamethrowers, 122-mm. self-propelled howitzers and a squadron of MiG-21Bs from the Soviets. This military would help them establish a Soviet Central America. El Salvador would be the first to fall. Then, with the aid of local guerrillas, the Sandinistas would subvert the governments of Guatemala, Costa Rica and Honduras. The Soviets had already agreed to this plan's guidelines. Now they needed detailed proposals. Throughout September and October, Miranda dutifully worked on the 68-page summary of military needs to be submitted to the Cubans and Soviets on November 17th.”

Former Sandinista State Security officer Miguel Bolanos indicated that Soviet coordination of the Sandinista’s plans for aggression against their neighbors began soon after the revolution in July 1979: “My first awareness of the interest Nicaragua had against Honduras was early after the triumph of the revolution in October 1979. At that time there were five Soviet generals as advisors to the Sandinistas. In one of their sessions, they displayed the map of Honduras with their military capabilities and next to it was what was left militarily of Nicaragua. It was decided and advised at that time that Nicaragua had to concentrate on a military buildup to fight against Honduras. Today, Nicaragua is capable of defeating Honduras militarily in a matter of days.”

According to an article in the March 8th, 1981 edition of the Boston Globe an FMLN commander Neto and his comrades had this vision for a communist victory of proletarian internationalism:

This is not just a Salvadoran revolution," said Neto. "We have to help all of the oppressed and exploited people of Latin America. After we triumph here we will go to Guatemala and offer our proletarian brothers the benefit of our experience." Neto said even revolution in Guatemala is not the final goal for him and his Marxist-Leninist comrades. "Eventually we will fight in Mexico," said Neto. He said the guerrillas are not convinced the Mexican regime is any more egalitarian than the Salvadoran junta they are now fighting. "The Mexican government is not deluding us by its support for our people," Neto said. "We know all about the Mexican government. We know what the government is." Neto's goal to fight in Guatemala and other Latin American countries was shared by nearly every guerrilla interviewed in Chalatenango. "Once all of the Third World countries have had their revolutions and withhold their natural resources from the United States, the capitalist system in the United States will collapse," said a former university studentturned- guerrilla

The Cuban and Sandinista intelligence were very confidant of the reliability of their assets and their capabilities in Mexico. Bolanos stated that: “"In long term strategy, Mexico is slated to be the last country to fall. The high ranking Cuban intelligence officials that I talked with were very confident of their position in Mexico. They used to say that 'we have everything under control.' They have a large number of agents in the unions and political parties. If they just snap their fingers, the situation will explode. They have also paid off and blackmailed the Mexican security forces, which would thus be paralyzed in a crisis."

According to Bolanos, the FMLN of El Salvador already had contingency plans for the composition of the new government if they were victorious: “The insurgents have all the positions' in their ‘government’ designated to certain individuals already. Everything has been carefully thought out: who shall have a Ministry, who will command the armed forces. They have everything very well calculated.”

Hostile communist forces in Latin America also targeted key strategic U.S. targets in time of conflict. Tomas Borge had indicated on September 22, 1979 that Sandinista aggression would also be carried out against U.S. forces in the Panama Canal Zone in support of the pro-Cuban Torrijos government: “Managua home service stated that in the course of a speech on 20th September at the Augusto Cesar Sandino Police Training Centre, Tomas Borge, Interior Minister and member of the Sandinist People's Army Supreme Command and of the FSLN Joint National Directorate, and assured the people of Panama that the Nicaraguan people were ready to help them defend the Canal. "We are willing to go to Panama with our Sandinist forces, carrying the rifles of the revolution."

The final target of the Soviet Union and their satellites is the continental United States (CONUS). In Notes on Grand Strategy, journalist J.R. Nyquist recounts what defecting Russian GRU Colonel Stanislav Lunev stated concerning the Soviet war plan against NATO during the 1980s. Nyquist wrote that it had four stages: “According to Lunev the First Strategic Echelon of the Warsaw Pact would drive over NATO's nuclear land mines and be destroyed. Then the Second Strategic Echelon would advance to exchange tactical nuclear blows with NATO forces. Then the Third Strategic Echelon would overrun Europe.” The elimination of Europe would then place the United States in an extremely vulnerable position. Soviet superiority in atomic, chemical, and biological arms would provide the communist world with the means of implementing nuclear blackmail. Most frightening was the admission by the Minister of the Russian Atomic Energy Agency Victor N. Mikhailov had 45,000 strategic and tactical nuclear bombs and missiles in their arsenal. This figure exceeded even the highest U.S. figures of Soviet nuclear warheads by 15,000. This sobering statistic should give pause for concern among policy makers concerning Soviet/Russian firepower and faulty U.S. intelligence gathering techniques and sources. This amount of Soviet firepower would be a large bargaining chip for potential nuclear blackmail that could leverage a U.S. Government surrender of CONUS territory.

According to Colonel Lunev, the Russian General Staff revised their war plan against the United States in 1991-1992. Lunev was informed that the “nuclear war plan is still good” against CONUS. The Russian Federation would send troops to occupy Alaska and Canada and launch their ICBMs and SLBMs against the United States. Meanwhile, Communist China would provide a follow-up invasion and occupation of CONUS with massive amounts of infantry troops. Lunev’s 1998 testimony about a Chinese conventional occupation of CONUS is confirmed by the secret speech given by China’s Minister of Defense and vice-chairman of China’s Central Military Commission Chi Haotian. Haotian’s speech combined aggressive nationalism with communism and viewed the United States as the ultimate enemy and vast expanse of land for the Chinese population to occupy. Haotian exhorted:

To resolve the issue of America we must be able to transcend conventions and restrictions. In history, when a country defeated another country or occupied another country, it could not kill all the people in the conquered land, because back then you could not kill people effectively with sabers or long spears, or even with rifles or machine guns. Therefore, it was impossible to gain a stretch of land without keeping the people on that land. However, if we conquered America in this fashion, we would not be able to make many people migrate there.

Only by using special means to “clean up” America will we be able to lead the Chinese people there. This is the only choice left for us. This is not a matter of whether we are willing to do it or not. What kind of special means is there available for us to “clean up” America? Conventional weapons such as fighters, canons, missiles and battleships won’t do; neither will highly destructive weapons such as nuclear weapons. We are not as foolish as to want to perish together with America by using nuclear weapons, despite the fact that we have been exclaiming that we will have the Taiwan issue resolved at whatever cost. Only by using non-destructive weapons that can kill many people will we be able to reserve America for ourselves. There has been rapid development of modern biological technology, and new bio weapons have been invented one after another. Of course we have not been idle; in the past years we have seized the opportunity to master weapons of this kind. We are capable of achieving our purpose of “cleaning up” America all of a sudden. When Comrade Xiaoping was still with us, the Party Central Committee had the perspicacity to make the right decision not to develop aircraft carrier groups and focus instead on developing lethal weapons that can eliminate mass populations of the enemy country. From a humanitarian perspective, we should issue a warning to the American people and persuade them to leave America and leave the land they have lived in to the Chinese people. Or at least they should leave half of the United States to be China’s colony, because America was first discovered by the Chinese. But would this work? If this strategy does not work, then there is only one choice left to us. That is, use decisive means to “clean up” America, and reserve America for our use in a moment. Our historical experience has proven that as long as we make it happen, nobody in the world can do anything about us. Furthermore, if the United States as the leader is gone, then other enemies have to surrender to us. Biological weapons are unprecedented in their ruthlessness, but if the Americans do not die then the Chinese have to die. If the Chinese people are strapped to the present land, a total societal collapse is bound to take place. According to the computation of the author of Yellow Peril, more than half of the Chinese will die, and that figure would be more than 800 million people! Just after the liberation, our yellow land supported nearly 500 million people, while today the official figure of the population is more than 1.3 billion. This yellow land has reached the limit of its capacity. One day, who knows how soon it will come, the great collapse will occur any time and more than half of the population will have to go. We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the United States], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the United States. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the United States, China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone! It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else! History will prove that we made the right choice.”

Despite the “fall” of the Soviet Union, communism continues to cast an aggressive design on the Free World nations. Our leaders must adopt a bi-partisan policy to take such sentiments of the Chinese and Russians seriously and prepare for massive attacks, as detailed in the above passages.

According to Lunev, such a Soviet/Chinese attack would utilize the element of surprise and would be preceded by sabotage by Spetsnaz. Such measures would also generate mass chaos, thus hampering the capitalist enemies’ ability to wage war. Special operations forces, covert cadres within communist parties, and undercover intelligence agents would be utilized in this initial overture of aggression. These forces are disguised as sailors, sport teams, trade delegations, embassy staff, students, and even natives of the target nation. According to Col. Stanislav Lunev, who defected from the GRU in 1992, GRU Spetsnaz/Special Destinations Group teams had already infiltrated the United States and targeted key military and political leaders. These Spetsnaz forces are training within the United States and their knowledge of foreign languages and cultures have allowed them to effectively pose as Germans or Eastern Europeans. Suitcase nuclear bombs and explosives disguised as bricks, logs, rocks, etc. were planted in well hidden caches in the Shenandoah and Hudson River Valleys, amongst other locations. Stores of chemical weapons were also included this secret Spetsnaz arsenal in the United States.

Lunev argued in 1998 that China and Russia combined could defeat the United States in a combined nuclear-conventional war. Under the revised Russian-Chinese war plan, anti-American Third World nations would be invited for “looting rights.” Based on the evidence, Cuba could qualify as a player in the above mentioned scenario. According to journalist Servando Gonzalez and Dr. Manuel Cereijo, Castro’s Tropas Especiales (Special Troops) have been training since 1990 for attacks against the United States. Vietnamese and Chinese military personnel were advising the Tropas Especiales to conduct operations in CONUS. Gonzalez details their specific regimen:

Since 1990, Cuban Special Forces troops (the ones under the direct command of Castro himself) have been training for the possibility of an attack directed at some parts of continental United States, most likely Florida. Intensive training courses have been underway, at least since 1990, under a program provided by Vietnam, at the Vietnam People's Army base at Hoa Binh, an inland town south-west of Hanoi. Personnel attending the school specialize in commando attacks and infiltration. They are considered by experts to be a very professional group, with great potential to inflict damage to a country. They are between 20 and 35 years old, and speak fluent English… These men are trained in infiltration techniques and operations and can be effectively used to carry bacteriological and chemical warfare to the United States.”

Post-Mao Chinese Communist Party leaders continued the policies of supporting world communist revolution. In a May 1994 visit, a U.S. Republican Party delegation met with the Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Mo Xiusong and asked: “Is the long-term aim of the Chinese Communist Party still world Communism?" Mo responded, ‘Yes, of course. That is why we exist.’” Chinese Communist theorists also predicted that major Western Powers (Japan, Germany, Russia, United States) would move away from capitalism and adopt their own versions of China’s “socialist market economy.” These nations would then comprise a “harmonious world” based on China’s system of international relations, known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence. Capitalist America is viewed by Communist China as a power in decline. For example, the 1997 book American Social Diseases by Wan Guang postulated that the United States was in decline because of the following socio-economic and political factors: 1) The great disparity between rich and poor 2) The homeless 3) Wide racial gaps 4)Right-wing extremist groups, i.e. [militias and white supremacist groups 5) Destruction of the family and the problems of children and women 6)Crime and drug use 7) Generation gaps 8) Spiritual and moral crisis ('spiritual deficit' and 'moral extinction,' 'excessive sexual indulgence')"

This decay is perceived as the Achilles’ Heel of the fabric of U.S. society by the Chinese Communists and is a key factor in easing the difficulties for totalitarian nations to overtake the Free World.

J.R. Nyquist noted in The Origins of the Fourth World War that the Soviets intended to divide the United States into military administrative zones of occupation. A similar plan for the division of the United States was reported earlier by former U.S. Senator Karl Mundt, who infiltrated a 1934 meeting of the Communist Party USA (CPUSA). At that meeting the CPUSA leaders expounded upon a plan for seizing power from within and subdividing the United States into nine administrative zones based upon river authorities, such as the TVA. Plans to divide CONUS and cede Alaska could be interpreted as a means to dissolve the national identity of the United States and its population.

Major General Jan Sejna also elaborated on the Soviet plan to conquer CONUS in a roundtable discussion with Dr. Joseph D. Douglass held at Summit University on November 28, 1987. Sejna stated that the Soviets and their allies would launch a nuclear attack against the strategic military, communications, and economic targets in the United States. As in Europe, the destruction would be expected by Soviet planners to create chaos amongst the population and U.S. military forces within CONUS. This unrest and division would provide fertile ground for the surrender of the U.S. Government. Dr. Douglass expected that disaffected portions of the U.S. military might provide troops to assist in the occupation of the United States. Sejna stated that quisling Salvation Committees would then be formed in the United States of by leftist politicians and collaborators that viewed accommodation as the best hope for the survival of our nation. There are clear contemporary historical examples of this situation in the 20th Century. One would be the case of occupied France during World War II. Many individuals who considered themselves patriots such as Petain, Weygand, Laval, and others, or ideological sympathizers such as Doriot, Deat, and Chateaubriant, cooperated with the German invaders. The Vichy regime became a political reality, despite the fact that relations between France and Germany had been characterized with open hostility and competing nationalisms for centuries.

Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the United States government ever considered the possibility that the Soviets might occupy CONUS. A fictionalized example of the prevalent mindset can be found in The Doomsday Scenario by L. Douglas Keeney, which was based on declassified plans and reports detailing a Soviet nuclear attack and survival/recovery effort by the U.S. Government. The plans and reports examined by Keeney in the course of writing the novel did not indicate or address the contingency of a Soviet conventional invasion and occupation.

The testimonies of Sejna and Lunev are clearly confirmed by Soviet military writings. Soviet military theory clearly endorsed the usage of nuclear weapons to create defeatism within the ranks of enemy armies and populations. Unlike U.S. Government documents, Soviet military literature emphasized the importance of final victory and occupation of enemy territory. Clearly, the United States was the glavny vrag or “Main Enemy.” The 1972 edition of Marxism Leninism on War and Army opined that, “The very first nuclear attack on the enemy may inflict such immense casualties and produce such vast destruction that his economic, moral-political and military capabilities will collapse.”

According to Marshal Sokolovsky in Soviet Military Strategy “In a future war, the socialist coalition will aim at conclusive political and military goals. To attain those goals, it will not be enough just to destroy the enemy’s means of nuclear attack, to defeat his main forces by missile blows and to disorganize his rear. For final victory … it will be absolutely necessary to smash the enemy’s armed forces completely, deprive him of strategic areas of deployment, liquidate his military bases, and occupy his strategically important regions... For this reason, the Ground Forces will undoubtedly play an important role, along with the missile forces, in achieving the final goals of the war”

Sokolovsky also felt that “The Soviet Union and the countries of people’s democracy, in order to protect their socialist achievements, will be forced adopt no less decisive aims directed towards the total defeat of the armed forces of the enemy with simultaneous disorganization of his interior zone, and towards suppression of the enemy’s will to resist, and rendering aid to the people to free them from the yoke of imperialism.”

The glavny vrag would clearly be the prized “strategically important” region to be crippled and occupied. Resistance to the occupying armies of socialism would be crushed. Colonel M.P. Skirdo in The People, The Army, The Commander stated that “With the liquidation of antagonistic classes and with the complete victory of socialism, the army of a socialist state concludes its internal function, namely, suppression of the residual resistance of exploiters within the country.” Lt. General Aviation G. Lobov elaborated on the real possibility of a satellite government seizing power in the ashes of a nuclear war: “when the enemy, as a result of the massive nuclear strikes inflicted upon him, such strikes being the main part of the attack, capitulates and peace loving forces accede to political power in his country….”

Another Soviet theorist Prokhorov implored that quisling leftists have a duty to seize power during a global war: “Under conditions of a sharp conflict, crisis situation which war engenders, the proletariat and all revolutionary elements in society have the particularly responsible duty to carry out a revolution, to overthrow the bourgeoisie, to take power into their own hands.”

Even during the 1980s, the USSR was committed to unconditional victory over the Main Enemy during a war of mass destruction. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov stated that “The principles of the development and the nature of training of the Soviet Armed Forces are aimed above all at repelling a possible aggression, inflicting crushing retaliatory blows on the aggressor and at guaranteeing the defence of the gains of the Great October Revolution.'' In the mid-1980s Ogarkov also opined in the pamphlet History Teaches Vigilance that “Proceeding from this, the Soviet military doctrine requires the ability not simply to defend but also to possess the ability to inflict crushing response strikes on an aggressor and rout it under any conditions.'' A 1980 Soviet Military Encyclopedia article by Marshal Ogarkov predicted that: “If nuclear war is foisted upon the Soviet Union, the Soviets will have definite advantages stemming from the just goals of the war and the advanced nature of their social and state system.” Ogarkov concluded that the war would create “objective possibilities for them to achieve victory.” Colonel General V. A. Merimsky wrote in Tactical Preparation of Motorized Tank Subunits (1987) that: “In order to achieve final victory, it is necessary, using the results of nuclear strikes, to complete the enemy’s defeat, to limit his possibilities for putting up resistance, and to occupy his territory.”

Ominously, the military theory of the Russian Federation has not been altered appreciably in favor a less truculent doctrine. A November 1993 special issue of Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) implicitly indicated that the United States and NATO would continue to be the Main Enemy of the Russian armed forces. The article stated:

For the duration of the military reform, the principal responsibility for the country's defense could be entrusted to nuclear weapons. Main provisions of the Russian Federation's military doctrine define the role of strategic nuclear forces and their possible use as follows: The aim of the policy of the Russian Federation in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to avert the threat of a nuclear war by precluding an aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation: shall never use its nuclear weapons against any other state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the July 1, 1968 which does not possess nuclear weapons unless: a) such a state, which has allied relations with a nuclear state, attacks the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other troops or its allies; b) such a state collaborates with a nuclear power in carrying out, or supporting, an invasion or an armed aggression against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces and other troops or its allies....

The USSR considered the United States and the rest of North America as a likely battleground for their armed forces. Classified Soviet military records outlined special zones which indicated “theaters of military action” (TVDs) for air, sea, and ground forces. According to these records, the TVDs would be subdivided into 1) North American TVD: consists of the lower forty eight states in CONUS 2) Alaska was included in the Far Eastern TVD 3) Canada; Mexico; Central America down to Panama; the West Indies; Greenland; and Iceland were included in the North American and Northwestern TVDs. This was another indication of the USSR’s intentions to launch massive attacks as a means to cripple the last bastion of capitalism and impose communism in the “Main Enemy.” The above-mentioned military doctrines would be put into brutal and bloody practice. Defector and intelligence information support the notion that the Soviets were seriously considering the usage of friendly leftist parties and terrorists to seize control of the U.S. Government in the event of encirclement and/or occupation of CONUS. Larry Grathwohl was an informant for the FBI within the communist revolutionary movement the Weather Underground (WUO). While collecting intelligence on the WUO, Grathwohl was privy to the group’s future plans. In an interview Grathwohl stated:

I brought up the subject of what's going to happen after we take over the government. You know, we become responsible for administrating, you know, 250 million people. And there was no answer. No one had given any thought to economics. How are you going to clothe and feed these people? The only thing that I could get was that they expected that the Cubans, the North Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Russians would all want to occupy different portions of the United States. They also believed that their immediate responsibility would be to protect against what they called the counter-revolution. And they felt that this counter-revolution could best be guarded against by creating and establishing re-education in the Southwest where we would take all of the people who needed to be re-educated into the new way of thinking and teach them how things were going to be. I asked, "Well, what is going to happen to those people that we can't re-educate, that are die-hard capitalists?" And the reply was that they'd have to be eliminated and when I pursued this further, they estimated that they'd have to eliminate 25 million people in these re-education centers. And when I say eliminate, I mean kill 25 million people. I want you to imagine sitting in a room with 25 people, most of whom have graduate degrees from Columbia and other well-known educational centers and hear them figuring out the logistics for the elimination of 25 million people and they were dead serious."

It is interesting to note that the supposedly opposing forces of the Soviet Union and China would appear to pool their forces together to jointly occupy the United States. We will be discussing the place of China in the Soviet war strategy in a future article. Former Black Panther terrorist Eldridge Cleaver revealed Soviet and Chinese long range strategy in a Reader’s Digest article:

Cleaver’s most astonishing experience abroad was to be invited to gatherings where the plans of other nations for the United States were freely discussed. ‘What was being said was really the projection of an entire strategy - namely that, first, the international communist movement would liberate the so-called Third World, and would colonize the world. That would isolate the United States. At the same time, the superiority in the balance of armed power would be shifting in favor of the new world. And then the moment would come when, because of the internal disintegration of the United States, it would be possible to destroy the U.S. military machine.’ Then the revolutionaries within the United States would seize power. The revolutionaries abroad have a slogan: ‘We will destroy them from without; they will destroy them from within’…They (communist powers) take for granted that they can count on certain elements inside the United States. This is part of their perspective: that they are eventually going to conquer and destroy; that they will win. These revelations Cleaver says he heard sometimes over cocktails at embassies. ‘I’ve talked with generals from the Soviet Union and marshals from China. I’ve been present when they toasted the destruction of the United States. They carry on constant planning of surprise attacks. They are out to eliminate, if possible, but in any case, to surround and surpass and neutralize the United States.”

Latin American satellites of the Soviet Union would apparently be conscripted into the effort to subjugate the United States through ideological rallying and territorial bribery. Former Polish Ambassador Zdzislaw Rurarz had a conversation with a Soviet official before he defected in 1981 about the usage of Mexico in the war against the United States. The article stated: “The official said the Germans had been premature in their efforts to manipulate the Mexicans to cause trouble for the U.S. in World War I. But with Mexico's big population increase, he thought the time would soon be ripe to try that ploy again. The Germans promised to help Mexico recover Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. The Soviet official said they might ‘add even a part of California.’ They already have a name for the area—Azatlan.” According to former DGI officer Major Florentino Aspillaga, Fidel Castro considered becoming a president of a united Latin America under Cuban communist domination as late as the mid 1980s. A Soviet conquest would have made this possibility a strong enticement for Castro’s participation in the neutralization and ultimate defeat of CONUS. In fact, the fictional novel and movie Amerika about a Soviet occupation of the United States presented Fidel Castro as a ruler of a “Greater Cuba.” This Greater Cuba would presumably include parts of Latin America and the Caribbean outside the original territory of the existing Republic of Cuba.

According to available evidence, Cuba appeared to be a militant partner in aggression against the United States. The island’s communist dictator, Fidel Castro, hated the United States and desired its destruction and humiliation. Castro stated in a letter to confidante Celia Sanchez that “I have sworn to myself that Americans are going to pay dearly for what they are doing. When this war is over, a much wider and bigger war will begin for me, the war I am going to wage against them. I realize that is going to be my true destiny.” In a 1959 meeting with military officers, Castro further revealed his intentions against the United States: “No, the war is just beginning, because this is going to end in a war against the United States." Such messianic and destructive sentiments allowed Castro to contemplate destructive actions against CONUS targets during a global war. Cuba coordinated their preparations against the United States with their communist allies worldwide. In the late 1970s, a large group of Cuban soldiers traveled and trained for beach landings in North Vietnam for a larger "simulated invasion of the United States." Castro also bragged in 1980 about the capabilities of his intelligence and sabotage officers in the United States in a meeting with top Sandinistas and Central American terrorists: “We have agents of absolute confidence all over the United States who are ready to undertake whatever actions are necessary at the time of our choosing. The Yankees cannot even begin to image the capabilities we have in their country. You all read about the riots in Miami...We can accomplish things that would make the riots in Florida look like a sunshower." CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) reports provided corroboration to the notion that Cuba placed infiltrators in the United States for the purposes of sabotage and terrorism. Apparently, an unknown portion of these infiltrators were not even Cuban nationals:

Also, CIA and DIA reports reveal the operation of an international communist youth training center southeast of Santiago de Cuba in the mid-and-late 1960s. The young people, many of whom were blacks and Vietnamese, were being trained for subversive operations against the United States. One intelligence source reported that many of these young people were children of French soldiers who had either defected to the Vietnamese communists during the French Indochina or were children of French forces who were POWs and still held by the Hanoi communists. Reportedly, they had been given Vietnamese wives, and the children were taken away from their parents at a very young age and sent to communist youth camps similar to those in the Soviet Union and "Hitler's Children" in Nazi Germany. According to a DIA source, their control officer was Jesus Jiminez Escobar. ‘The students (agents) were to be infiltrated into the United States through normal airlift channels and would be claimed by relatives on their arrival.’ ‘Their subversive activities against the United States would include sabotage in connection with race riots...’ Another DIA source said that "the 5th contingent was infiltrated into the U.S. from Canada through Calais, Maine.’

Castro also had military plans for sabotage and destruction against targets in the U.S. stretching as far back as at least 1962. For example, Castro ordered his air force to program their computers on MIG-23s to attack the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant in Homestead, Florida in retaliation for the U.S. led liberation of Grenada in 1983. According to General Rafael del Pino, who was a commander of the Cuban Air Force at the time, Castro intended to inflict heavy physical and psychological casualties: “I want to do something that they will remember for the rest of their lives and then, when we are gone, history will remind them that we were the only ones who made them pay dearly for their imperialistic arrogance around the world."

Another instance of Cuban plans for aggression against the CONUS dated from 1962, with the staff and officialdom of their UN Mission in New York City as the participants. An attaché to the Cuban UN Mission, Roberto Santiesteban Casanova was one of the ringleaders of a plot to destroy oil refineries in NJ, the Statue of Liberty, major department stores, the 42nd Street Bus Terminal, and Grand Central Station. Fortunately, the FBI prevented this plot from becoming a tragic reality. In the 1980s, Soviet advisers at Cuban chemical warfare schools were reported to witness Castro bragging that he would be prepared to kill millions of Americans with biological and chemical weapons that he had stockpiled.

Although the plans detailed above for the defeat and occupation of the United States may now seem fantastical, it is clear that the Communist strategists that developed them anticipated the willing collaboration of many Americans. For the most part, these collaborators were to be drawn from the ranks of the Communist Party of the United States and the radical leftwing groups affiliated with them, such as the Black Panthers. But there is also reason to believe that they also expected the willing cooperation of the leaders of U. S. multinational corporations as well. A large percentage of these corporations favored expanded trade and technology transfers with the communist countries, and this was especially true of those that specialized in computers, machinery, steel and other metallurgical products, food, finance, and consumer goods. Many communist nations already had (and still have) trade and economic councils that included senior executives of private corporations, and communist party officials and senior intelligence officers. Such councils served as instruments to gain high technology goods and as conduits for propaganda to weaken U.S. resistance to Soviet and communist measures for world domination. Secretive organizations such as the former U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC) were known to harbor a large number of high-ranking KGB officers, such as General Yevgeny Petrovich Pitrovanov. Arguably, the attitudes of détente, internationalist minded members of the U.S. business and governmental elite was summarized by the comment made by the former head of the Ford Foundation H. Rowan Gaither to Congressional investigator Norman Dodd: "Mr. Dodd, all of us who have a hand in the making of policies here have had experience either with the OSS during the war or the European Economic Administration after the war. We've had experience operating under directives, and these directives emanate and did emanate from the White House. Now, we still operate under just such directives. Would you like to know what the substance of these directives is? I said, “Mr. Gaither, I’d like very much to know,” whereupon he made this statement to me: “Mr. Dodd, we are here operate in response to similar directives, the substance of which is that we shall use our grant-making power so to alter life in the United States that it can be comfortably merged with the Soviet Union.

Leaked copies of the USTEC journal indicated this attitude of a common merging of interests of the USSR and United States. One example was an ad placed by Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) depicting the East Coast of the United States connected to the western border of the Soviet Union. Other advertisements and articles depicted what was portrayed as fruitful economic collaboration between the Soviets and American businesses. Defectors from communist parties and countries alleged unusually close ties with big business elites. Former Novosti official and seasoned KGB-flack Yuri Bezmenov (aka Tomas Schuman) claimed that: “During trips to the Moscow airport he (Bezmenov) noticed private American jets landing, the occupants hugged by high ranking communist officials, and then whisked away in government vehicles. When he asked his supervisor about the Americans he was told that "they are our friends" and that it would be best if he didn't inquire further about such matters. Eventually he came to the conclusion that the apparent conflict between communism and capitalism was contrived, and that wealthy capitalists were working closely with high-ranking communists. That realization led him to defect from the Soviet Union.”

Thus it is difficult for serious observers to escape the conclusion that portions of the U.S. business community would have willingly collaborated with the Soviets if they had succeeded in occupying the United States. Czech Major General Jan Sejna alleged that collaboration between Western bankers and the Czech Communists extended to a massive drug-running operation designed to demoralize the free nations of the world. “Jan Sejna made the arrangements for the Western bankers to visit Czechoslovakia in order to plan with the KGB how they would launder the profits of the Red Cocaine operation.”

Former FBI official and author W. Cleon Skousen recounted a conversation he had with Dr. Bella Dodd, who had been a high-level member of the U.S. Communist Party: “I think the Communist conspiracy is merely a branch of a much bigger conspiracy!" she told him. According to Skousen, she had first became aware of some mysterious superleadership right after World War II when the U.S. Communist Party had difficulty getting instructions from Moscow on several vital matters requiring immediate attention. The American Communist hierarchy was told that any time they had an emergency of this kind they should contact any one of three designated persons at the Waldorf Towers. According to Dr. Dodd, whenever the Party obtained instructions from any of these three men, Moscow always ratified them. "What puzzled Dr. Dodd," Skousen records, "was that not one of these three contacts was a Russian. Nor were any of them Communists. In fact, all three were extremely wealthy American capitalists." "I would certainly like to find out who is really running things," said Dr. Dodd.”

If Dr. Dodd was correct, then these unnamed business executives served, at least, as conduits or messengers for communist orders originating in Moscow. Still, the notion that certain capitalists actually controlled the communist movement seems implausible to this writer. The available evidence suggests that certain elements of the U.S. multinational corporation elite cooperated with the communists as partners to ultimately weaken our resistance to totalitarianism. Many historical examples abound concerning capitalist cooperation with communist and other totalitarian, collectivist parties. They included: Lenin’s proposal to emulate the German World War I Zwangiwirtscaft, or war economy, by conscripting the Russian business elite to increase production; the “patriotic capitalists” that collaborated with the Chinese Communist dictatorship from 1949 until about the mid 1950s; and the German and later French and other Western European industrialists that cooperated with the Nazi’s during World War II. Here it is important to note that the Nazi’s and the puppet regimes they established adhered to an anti-capitalist, collectivist ideology that regimented and at times threatened the same businessmen and industrialists that collaborated with them in occupied Europe. Their propaganda also exhorted the theme of liberation and the destruction of what was termed the exploitative, capitalistic plutocracies of the United States and Britain.

During the Cold War, American policy makers failed to heed the available evidence and prepare the population psychologically and militarily to confront the threat. As this paper has sought to demonstrate, the Soviet Union and its global allies were committed to the destruction and ultimate occupation of the United States, and – unfortunately – the old threats have not entirely disappeared. Like the mythical shape shifter, they have assumed new and perhaps more deadly forms.

In the aftermath of 9-11, it is no longer plausible to assume that the American homeland is safe from attack. For that reason, I would offer the following policy prescriptions to help counter the manifest threats and to protect the population of the United States:

1) Continuous and uninterrupted investment and deployment of advanced infantry, armored, airpower, and naval weapons. Reject all treaties that allow us to prevent missile

defense systems, while enemies build such weapons up in a duplicitous fashion.

2) Revitalize a civil defense system that would truly allow survivability during and after an attack of ICBMs or portable WMDs containing atomic, biological, and chemical

warheads. Stock the necessary supplies (food, antidotes, medicines, etc.) in logically located storage facilities/shelters in case of emergency.

3) Immediately reverse "globalization" and outsourcing and revitalize American consumer, strategic, and energy industries in order to regain self-sufficiency. This would mean initial sacrifices by labor, management and stockholders in the short term; but social stability and improved economic employment prospects would ultimately result.

4)End the unnatural emphasis on market hedonism and the shopping mall regime, which cripples the soul, our productive capacity, and our sense of values.

5) Re-establish meaningful internal security measures to monitor and if legally warranted prosecute subversive and terrorist organizations and support groups in the USA. This

also means restoring congressional investigations of such individuals and groups. Constitutional liberties must be strongly maintained, yet not used as a clever excuse to destroy

the security and fabric of the Republic.

6) Upgrading our intelligence and counterintelligence by accepting inconvenient and unpopular truths such as moles and penetrations of our CIA, FBI, armed forces, etc. to point of compromising technical information and altering strategic and foreign policies. Setting a higher and stricter standard for the quality of personnel employed in

intelligence and military agencies in order to minimize blackmail and compromise by enemy nations.

7) Shut down, if necessary, embassies, trade missions, interests sections, front companies, and UN Missions of hostile nations in order to disrupt and uproot espionage, propaganda/disinformation, and smuggling/trading networks. If necessary, U.S. diplomats and personnel could meet with enemy nation diplomats regarding international issues on an agreed upon neutral third party country such as Switzerland. The most important goal of this point is to keep their networks out of the USA.

8) Place strictly enforced regulations on the private sector and government bodies such as the U.S. Export-Import Bank precluding them from providing loans, grants, machinery, technology, food, medicine, and other products to hostile totalitarian regimes and "liberation" movements

As a people and as a nation we must heed the lessons of history in order to confront both the continuing threats posed by totalitarian states and movements, and the more recent and perhaps more immediate dangers posed by Islamist states and terrorist organizations. Thus it seems fitting to close this paper with the quotation that opened it: “He who does not learn from history is doomed to repeat it.”

### 3

#### TPA will pass—PC key

Parnes, 1/21 (Amie, 1/21/2014, “Obama: Give me fast track trade,” <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/195858-white-house-works-to-convince-dems-to-give-obama-fast-track-on-trade>))

The White House is making a major push to convince Congress to give the president trade promotion authority (TPA), which would make it easier for President Obama to negotiate pacts with other countries.

A flurry of meetings has taken place in recent days since legislation was introduced to give the president the authority, with U.S. Trade Representative Mike Froman meeting with approximately 70 lawmakers on both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate.

White House chief of staff Denis McDonough has also been placing calls and meeting with top Democratic lawmakers in recent days to discuss trade and other issues.

Republicans have noticed a change in the administration’s interest in the issue, which is expected to be a part of Obama’s State of the Union address in one week.

While there was “a lack of engagement,” as one senior Republican aide put it, there is now a new energy from the White House since the bill dropped.

The effort to get Congress to grant Obama trade promotion authority comes as the White House seeks to complete trade deals with the European Union, and a group of Asian and Latin American countries as part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP.

The authority would put time limits on congressional consideration of those deals and prevent the deals from being amended by Congress. That would give the administration more leverage with trading partners in its negotiations.

The trade push dovetails with the administration’s efforts to raise the issue of income inequality ahead of the 2014 midterm elections. The White House is pressing Republicans to raise the minimum wage and extend federal unemployment benefits.

The difference is, on the minimum wage hike and unemployment issue, Obama has willing partners in congressional Democrats and unions, who are more skeptical of free trade. Republicans are more the willing partner on backing trade promotion authority.

Legislation introduced last week to give Obama trade promotion authority was sponsored by House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp (R-Mich.) and Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus (D-Mont.), as well as Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the ranking member on Finance.

No House Democrats are co-sponsoring the bill, however, and Rep. Sandy Levin (D-Mich.), the Ways and Means Committee ranking member, and Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.), the panel’s former chairman, have both criticized it. They said the legislation doesn’t give enough leverage and power to Congress during trade negotiations.

Getting TPA passed would be a major victory for the administration, and one that would please business groups, but the White House will first have to convince Democrats to go along with it.

One senior administration official said the White House has been in dialogue with lawmakers on both sides of the aisle “with a real focus on Democrats” to explain TPA and take into account their concerns.

“Any trade matter presents challenges,” the senior administration official said, adding that White House officials are “devoted” to working with members on the issue.

The Democratic opposition makes it highly unlikely the trade promotion authority bill, in its current form at least, will go anywhere.

One big problem is that it was negotiated by Baucus, who is about to leave the Senate to become ambassador to China.

Baucus will be replaced by Sen. Ron Wyden (Ore.), who is said to disagree with the approach taken by his predecessor. Democratic aides predict the legislation, which Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-Nev.) called “controversial” last week, would have to be completely redone to gain traction among lawmakers in their party.

Some Democrats might see a disconnect between the White House’s push for trade and it’s separate push on income inequality, which has been embraced by the party.

But that doesn’t mean the White House won’t ramp up their focus on trade in the coming weeks and months.

Senior congressional aides expect trade to be a part of Obama’s upcoming State of the Union address, since the White House has made clear that the trade bill is a priority and the TPP trade pact is a core part of the administration’s overall jobs agenda, in terms of increasing exports and opening markets.

“This is a priority of the president's,” White House press secretary Jay Carney told reporters last week. “It's part of a broad approach to expanding exports and, you know, creating more opportunities for our businesses to grow. And we're going to continue to push for it.”

In the same vein, House Republicans will continue to increase pressure on the administration to get Democrats on board.

“The White House carries the weight on this,” one senior House aide said.

#### Plan kills CIR—focus and PC Link

Shear, 13

(Michael, NYT White house correspondent, 5/5, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/world/americas/in-latin-america-us-shifts-focus-from-drug-war-to-economy.html?pagewanted=all>)

Last week, Mr. Obama returned to capitals in Latin America with a vastly different message. Relationships with countries racked by drug violence and organized crime should focus more on economic development and less on the endless battles against drug traffickers and organized crime capos that have left few clear victors. The countries, Mexico in particular, need to set their own course on security, with the United States playing more of a backing role. That approach runs the risk of being seen as kowtowing to governments more concerned about their public image than the underlying problems tarnishing it. Mexico, which is eager to play up its economic growth, has mounted an aggressive effort to play down its crime problems, going as far as to encourage the news media to avoid certain slang words in reports. “The problem will not just go away,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue. “It needs to be tackled head-on, with a comprehensive strategy that includes but goes beyond stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty. “Obama becomes vulnerable to the charge of downplaying the region’s overriding issue, and the chief obstacle to economic progress,” he added. “It is fine to change the narrative from security to economics as long as the reality on the ground reflects and fits with the new story line.” Administration officials insist that Mr. Obama remains cleareyed about the security challenges, but the new emphasis corresponds with a change in focus by the Mexican government. The new Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, took office in December vowing to reduce the violence that exploded under the militarized approach to the drug war adopted by his predecessor, Felipe Calderón. That effort left about 60,000 Mexicans dead and appears not to have significantly damaged the drug-trafficking industry. In addition to a focus on reducing violence, which some critics have interpreted as taking a softer line on the drug gangs, Mr. Peña Nieto has also moved to reduce American involvement in law enforcement south of the border. With friction and mistrust between American and Mexican law enforcement agencies growing, Mr. Obama suggested that the United States would no longer seek to dominate the security agenda. “It is obviously up to the Mexican people to determine their security structures and how it engages with other nations, including the United States,” he said, standing next to Mr. Peña Nieto on Thursday in Mexico City. “But the main point I made to the president is that we support the Mexican government’s focus on reducing violence, and we look forward to continuing our good cooperation in any way that the Mexican government deems appropriate.” In some ways, conceding leadership of the drug fight to Mexico hews to a guiding principle of Mr. Obama’s foreign policy, in which American supremacy is played down, at least publicly, in favor of a multilateral approach. But that philosophy could collide with the concerns of lawmakers in Washington, who have expressed frustration with what they see as a lack of clarity in Mexico’s security plans. And security analysts say the entrenched corruption in Mexican law enforcement has long clouded the partnership with their American counterparts. Putting Mexico in the driver’s seat on security marks a shift in a balance of power that has always tipped to the United States and, analysts said, will carry political risk as Congress negotiates an immigration bill that is expected to include provisions for tighter border security. “If there is a perception in the U.S. Congress that security cooperation is weakening, that could play into the hands of those who oppose immigration reform,” said Vanda Felbab-Brown, a counternarcotics expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington. “Realistically, the border is as tight as could be and there have been few spillovers of the violence from Mexico into the U.S.,” she added, but perceptions count in Washington “and can be easily distorted.” “Drugs today are not very important to the U.S. public over all,” she added, “but they are important to committed drug warriors who are politically powerful.” Representative Michael T. McCaul, a Texas Republican who is chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, has warned against the danger of drug cartels forming alliances with terrorist groups. “While these threats exist, you would be surprised to find that the administration thinks its work here is done,” he wrote in an opinion article for Roll Call last month, pressing for more border controls in the bill. The Obama administration has said any evidence of such cooperation is very thin, but even without terrorist connections, drug gangs pose threats to peace and security. Human rights advocates said they feared the United States would ease pressure on Mexico to investigate disappearances and other abuses at the hands of the police and military, who have received substantial American support. The shift in approach “suggests that the Obama administration either doesn’t object to these abusive practices or is only willing to raise such concerns when it’s politically convenient,” said José Miguel Vivanco, director of Human Rights Watch’s Americas division. Still, administration officials have said there may have been an overemphasis on the bellicose language and high-profile hunts for cartel leaders while the real problem of lawlessness worsens. American antidrug aid is shifting more toward training police and shoring up judicial systems that have allowed criminals to kill with impunity in Mexico and Central America. United States officials said Mr. Obama remains well aware of the region’s problems with security, even as he is determined that they not overshadow the economic opportunities. It is clear Mr. Obama, whatever his words four years ago, now believes there has been too much security talk. In a speech to Mexican students on Friday, Mr. Obama urged people in the two countries to look beyond a one-dimensional focus on what he called real security concerns, saying it is “time for us to put the old mind-sets aside.” And he repeated the theme later in the day in Costa Rica, lamenting that when it comes to the United States and Central America, “so much of the focus ends up being on security.” “We also have to recognize that problems like narco-trafficking arise in part when a country is vulnerable because of poverty, because of institutions that are not working for the people, because young people don’t see a brighter future ahead,” Mr. Obama said in a news conference with Laura Chinchilla, the president of Costa Rica.

#### Passing TPA is critical to the future viability of the WTO – which will collapse now.

Jeffrey Schott 6/14/13 Senior Fellow, Peterson Institute for International Economics Payoff from the World Trade Agenda

Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC

June 14, 2013 http://www.piie.com/publications/papers/transcript-20130614.pdf

Now, what are the prospects for Bali? Well, they’re not so good. Trade ministers are prone to accentuate the positive. But when APEC trade leaders met in Surabaya, Indonesia in April of this year, they admitted, and I need to quote this. This is what they said: “The negotiation as it stands now is not on course to lead to a successful outcome at the Ministerial Conference 9 in Bali.” And then even more ominously they said: “The continued viability of the WTO’s negotiating function is at serious risk.” So that’s what our trade leaders, our optimistic trade leaders are saying about the prospects for moving forward later this year in Bali. And it underscores the task that Terry and others have. And it has to be more than the business community, but as Fred said it has to be certainly pushed hard by the business community to just get the officials and the negotiators to recognize that there’s a lot at stake and a big window of opportunity to make progress, but a big cost if they don’t. Now, what are the reasons for the impasse? And this is something that goes beyond what we put in our study. It’s more of a postscript to our study to look at the task going forward. And there are a number of problems that beset the preparations for the Bali Ministerial. You can call them Bali aches if you like. Oh, yeah, I was wondering whether to say that, and obviously I shouldn’t have. The first is issue with linkages. These are tactical gambits that risk blocking agreement like similar moves blocked agreement on the overall DOHA agenda over the past 10 years. And the key problem going forward for Bali is linking what is called food security subsidies with the trade facilitation agreement. There are important issues with regard to food security. There are important issues with regard to agricultural subsidies. But they should not be used in a way that blocks the ability to get the big deliverable out of Bali. And negotiators are still tied up in knots on how to do that. The second problem regards imbalances. Each country has a different idea of what is a balanced accord. Now, the terminology is important. In the past, we talked in trade negotiations about reciprocity. Reciprocity is an ambiguous term, but it’s a lot clearer than talking about balanced because each country hastheir own idea of what balanced is and there’s no consistent standard to set it on. So the first imbalance derives from differences in how countries value the benefit of policy change, basically taking what’s going on now and changing what countries do in order to open up more opportunities from trade and investment and how they value the increase in policy predictability that comes when new obligations constrain the ability of governments to reverse liberalization and to add new protectionism. So those are important. How do you value those things? In fact, the appreciation of the value of those two aspects is sometimes not well understood. The second imbalance comes between the level of progress that is needed on market access across agriculture and manufacturing and services, and the progress on commitments to new rule-making obligations, which often also encompass reforms that result in improved market access. This is part of the problem with the duty-free, quota-free issue and the resistance to going to a 100 percent coverage of tariff lines in a number of countries. There needs to be progress both on the coverage of the tariff preferences for the least developed countries. But there also needs to be progress on the eligibility rules for qualifying for the preferential rates. I mean, there are some countries that provide a 100 percent duty-free, quota-free treatment for least developed countries, but those countries don’t get access to that market because the eligibility rules, the content requirements and the like, basically block them from access to those markets. So those two things have to be done. There has to be a greater liberalization of the eligibility requirements to make those LDC preferences meaningful. And third, there are leadership lapses. And this has been throughout the DOHA Round, so this is nothing new. The big players, developed and developing, need to put their chips on the table. For the U.S. and the EU, this means real constraints on farm supports and real new access for the exports of the least developed countries. These countries should be more responsive with regards to cuts of agricultural export subsidies—that’s one of our initiatives in our study. And indeed, there has been suggestions for 16 Bali that developing countries want the U.S. and Europe to commit to a 50 percent down payment on reductions of agricultural export subsidies, but that’s actually doable given the current climate of high commodity prices and should be acceptable if the deal included a snapback clause. But it seems to be resisted so far. And this is one area where the negotiators are being a bit too risk-averse. For China, it means dropping the charade that they are recently a ceded member to the WTO, and therefore, don’t have to do anymore. They need to do more. They need to commit to broader liberalization than other developing countries. And they have the ability to do that. For all the BRICs, it means advancing services negotiations as a means to unblock the negotiating impasse on agriculture and on NAMA. Now, this audience probably is focusing on, well, how the heck is the United States going to do in any of this. And it leads to the question of what about trade promotion authority. For the U.S., passage of new trade promotion authority would send a very positive signal that we were willing and able to make these commitments and follow through on them, and it should be done soon. And I was pleased that Mike Froman in these confirmation hearings gave the committee assurances that he would work closely with the Finance and Ways and Means Committee that are already doing preparatory work on new legislation. Now, soon in this context given legislative realities means that a bill should be either passed or at least well advanced before Bali. I think if there’s a clear sign that the Congress is moving forward and will enact trade promotion authority that this will make it easier for the U.S. negotiators to put together the type of deal that serves our broad interest and those of the trading system. But, passage of the farm bill could send exactly the opposite signal, at least the way it is being considered right now and if key Senate provisions are enacted. It’s interesting that legislators hardly take into consideration at all international trade negotiations when they put together a farm bill. And while they should deal with the concerns of their constituents, their constituents are operating in global markets. And it’s interesting that while there’s interesting cutting subsidies in the Congress, the subsidies that they’re considering cutting are the only ones that are actually legal under the WTO system. So they’re cutting the legal subsidies and proposing new subsidies that would, if not be illegal, would be actionable and considered trade distorting under the WTO. So this is a problem and for Bali, if Congress doesn’t act on the farm bill, that may be a positive thing. So in sum, I think what has come out of our study is that there are a lot of important things that should and can be done. A Bali deal is critical to rebuilding confidence in WTO negotiations. And simply put, officials need to demonstrate that WTO talks can produce results. That used to be why everyone went to Geneva during the GATT era. But there has been a great deal of skepticism in recent years that negotiators recognized the urgency of getting something done. And second, Bali needs to produce a solid down payment on a bigger WTO package that would be pulled together and accelerated negotiations post Bali.

**Trade wars go nuclear**

**Miller and Elwood**, **98** (Vincent and James, Founder and Vice-President of the International Society for Individual Liberty, “Free Trade or Proectionism? The Case Against Trade Restrictions,” www.isil.org/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html)

WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars: Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets. British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War. In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I. In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II. THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD PEACE The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age? "What generates war is the economic philosophy of nationalism: embargoes, trade and foreign exchange controls, monetary devaluation, etc. The philosophy of protectionism is a philosophy of war."  
Ludwig von Mises

### 4

#### Text: The United States congress should ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The United States federal government should offer China resumption of laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges on arms control practice.

**The United States Department of Agriculture should substantially increase its investment in agricultural scientific research.**  
  
**ag research generates innovations that solves**  
**Lugar, 4** – U.S. Senator – Indiana,

(Richard, “Plant Power” Our Planet v. 14 n. 3, <http://www.unep.org/OurPlanet/imgversn/143/lugar.html>, JZG)

To meet the expected demand for food over the next 50 years, we in the United States will have to grow roughly three times more food on the land we have. That’s a tall order. My farm in Marion County, Indiana, for example, yields on average 8.3 to 8.6 tonnes of corn per hectare – typical for a farm in central Indiana. To triple our production by 2050, we will have to produce an annual average of 25 tonnes per hectare.¶ Can we possibly boost output that much? Well, it’s been done before. Advances in the use of fertilizer and water, improved machinery and better tilling techniques combined to generate a threefold increase in yields since 1935 – on our farm back then, my dad produced 2.8 to 3 tonnes per hectare. Much US agriculture has seen similar increases.¶ But of course there is no guarantee that we can achieve those results again. Given the urgency of expanding food production to meet world demand, we must invest much more in scientific research and target that money toward projects that promise to have significant national and global impact. For the United States, that will mean a major shift in the way we conduct and fund agricultural science. Fundamental research will generate the innovations that will be necessary to feed the world.

**Lab-to-lab Solves relations and escalation**

Pollack ‘9 [Josh. Consultant to the Govt on Arms Control and Proliferation. “Emerging Strategic Dilemmas in US-Chinese Relations” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Aug 09. ln ]

In the meantime, the countries can pursue a number of working- level activities to develop greater mutual familiarity and promote understanding of each side’s concerns. Expanding military-to-mili- tary dialogue would be valuable, as would resuming the laboratory- to-laboratory exchanges that have been suspended for more than a decade. Renewed lab-to-lab contacts could help to build a common understanding of verification technology, information barriers, and other technical aspects of arms control practice. Arms control ex- pert Lewis Dunn also has put forth a useful proposal to hold consul- tations with Chinese officials during the course of the ongoing Nu-clear Posture Review and to provide briefings on the results.23 Whatever mechanisms U.S. and Chinese officials settle on, it is important for them to start early and to continue even in the event of one of the periodic incidents that tend to perturb the U.S.-Chinese relationship. Without a dialogue aimed at developing agreements to regulate military interactions and limit forces, mutual risk and suspicion will only grow.

#### Ratification will restore US nonproliferation credibility – solves international norms and safeguards

Joseph ‘9 (Jofi Joseph is a senior Democratic foreign policy staffer in the United States Senate, “Renew the Drive for CTBT Ratification”, April 2009, Washington Quarterly, <http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr_Joseph.pdf>, CMR)

Senate ratification of the CTBT matters because it would be hailed as a renewed U.S. commitment to the essential pact at the heart of the NPT. Much of the international community, especially leading nonnuclear weapons states like Brazil, Japan, South Africa, and Sweden, believe that the United States has backtracked on the NPT’s basic bargain contained in Article VI: in exchange for the pledge by nonnuclear weapons states to not acquire nuclear weapons, the United States and the four other recognized nuclear weapons powers China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom would pursue measures ‘‘in good faith’’ to cease the nuclear arms race and achieve eventual nuclear disarmament. Under the Clinton administration, the United States explicitly reaffirmed its commitment to eventual nuclear disarmament at the 1995 NPT Review Conference in exchange for the agreement of other States Parties to indefinitely extend the NPT. Without this compromise, the NPT could have been allowed to expire or, more likely, extended only for a fixed period. The 2000 NPT Review Conference followed up with the adoption by all States Parties of a thirteen-step plan to pave the path for eventual general nuclear disarmament, with the first step calling for the CTBT’s early entry into force.4 In the years following the 2000 conference, however, the United States was viewed as diverging from, and in some cases repudiating, many of those agreed upon measures. Bush exercised the right of the United States to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty, viewed by many nations as a pillar of strategic stability. The administration’s 2002 Nuclear Posture Review explicitly discussed the circumstances under which a first use of nuclear weapons could be contemplated, and referred to possible target nations.5 Administration officials discussed renewed efforts on research and development of new nuclear weapons, including so-called bunker buster bombs and miniaturized nuclear warheads, that could lend themselves to more accessible use in a conflict. Finally, the administration withheld some key funding from the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the international secretariat responsible for all relevant preparations for the CTBT’s entry into force, and sought congressional approval to shorten the timeline for required preparations before a nuclear weapons test. In light of this recent discouraging history, an unmistakable commitment from Obama that he will seek Senate ratification of the CTBT during his first term in office may do more than any other single measure to indicate to the world that the United States is not only listening to, but also respects, the views of the international community. While it will do little to directly convince rogue states like Iran or North Korea to halt their nuclear weapons programs, it will strengthen the hand of the United States as it seeks to build international coalitions to squeeze those hostile states. Indeed, a recent survey of sixteen key nonnuclear weapons states reached the conclusion that ratification of the CTBT ‘‘would send a very strong signal’’ to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to disarmament.6 The commitment will also position the United States particularly well for the NPT Review Conference scheduled for 2010. These review conferences, held every five years, offer an opportunity for NPTsignatories to gather and assess the overall health of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the 2000 conference, the United States agreed to seek early entry into force of the CTBT and committed to twelve other specific steps to promote nonproliferation and disarmament. Upon taking office the next year, the Bush administration swiftly renounced these commitments, setting the stage for a 2005 conference viewed by all parties involved as an unmitigated disaster. A concrete pledge by the United States to seek CTBT ratification will therefore energize the 2010 conference, and offer Washington greater leverage to push through potential reforms it may seek regarding the export of reprocessing and enrichment technology or automatic sanctions against states that violate their IAEA obligations.

### Alloys

**No bioweapon risk**

**Leitenberg 9** - Center for International and Security Studies, After a half dozen years as an academic and researcher in the sciences, Milton Leitenberg began his career in arms control in fall 1966. He has worked at SIPRI, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and Cornell University. (Milton, The Nonproliferation Review, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of Bioterrorism,” Volume 16, Issue 1 March 2009, pages 95 – 109, Informa world)

Statements by innumerable U.S. government officials, academic analysts, and journalists between 1989 and 2003 nearly uniformly concluded that the proliferation of state-run BW programs was a constantly increasing trend.21 It now seems clear that was not the case: The trend of proliferation of state BW programs was probably more or less flat. In recent years, official U.S. estimates of the number of such programs have declined by at least a third, leaving roughly a half dozen at most. In fact, as of 2008, the U.S. government apparently thinks the appropriate number is six.22 The U.S. intelligence community has qualified its assessments of those remaining programs to such a significant degree that it is difficult, if not impossible, to judge what degree of “offensive” nature—the development, testing, production or stockpiling of biological agents or weapons—exists in those programs. As for proliferation from any state-run offensive BW programs, available evidence indicates that it has been minimal. None at all is known to have taken place from the former South African or Iraqi BW programs. As for the Soviet Union, only about ten scientists are known to have emigrated to any country of BW proliferation concern in the post-Soviet period. Some were recruited by Iran, but most of this group worked in institutes belonging to the former Soviet Academy of Sciences and not in research institutes primarily serving the former Soviet BW program. Several others emigrated to Israel. The United States never included Israel in its lists of BW proliferant states, although Israel almost certainly maintained an offensive BW program for many years and may still do so. One can be even more definitive regarding assistance from state-run BW programs to terrorist organizations seeking to develop or to produce biological agents or weapons: there is no evidence whatsoever of any such activity. U.S. intelligence agencies have always considered the likelihood of such assistance to be extremely low, and they expect the same to be the case in the future.23

#### Other countries fill in

Bosamia 13 – Dhanvi is a writer for the Shipping Intelligence Network. (“Nickel Ore Trade: Chinese Imports Driving Growth”, September 25, 2013, http://www.clarksons.net/markets/feature\_display.asp?section=&news\_id=34533&title=Nickel+Ore+Trade%3A+Chinese+Imports+Driving+Growth)

Importing Nickel Ore

The Graph of the Month shows monthly Chinese nickel ore imports by source and annual Chinese stainless steel production. Between 2007 and 2012, Chinese stainless steel production increased by 8.9mt to 16.1mt. The production of stainless steel traditionally requires refined nickel however in 2005 China started to produce nickel pig iron (NPI) from nickel ore, which has been used as a cheaper alternative to stainless steel scrap and nickel metal in the production of stainless steel. The high availability of nickel ore in South-East Asia has facilitated this growth of Chinese nickel ore imports.

Sourcing Nickel Ore

The Philippines and Indonesia are the major exporters of nickel ore to China and the relative share of each exporter has varied since 2007. A temporary ban on Indonesian mineral exports for most of 2012 led to a fall in Indonesian exports and market share last year, with shipments in July 2012 totalling just 1.4mt. However, during this period **the Philippines was rapidly able to make up for this decrease**, enabling Chinese imports to grow 35% in the full year. This strong increase in imports facilitated both an increase in Chinese NPI production during the year, and a significant build up of nickel ore stocks.

Stocking Up

So far in 2013, Chinese nickel ore demand has remained strong, supported by an 18% y-o-y increase in Chinese stainless steel production in Q1 2013 to 4.4mt. In full year 2013, Chinese nickel ore imports are projected to reach 78.1mt, up 7% y-o-y. China has increased imports from both Indonesia and the Philippines in the year to date. However, given that the Indonesian government currently intends to ban exports of unprocessed minerals again in 2014, it is expected that China will source a growing proportion of nickel ore from the Philippines if this regulation is introduced. Therefore, the ban is not expected to significantly reduce China’s nickel ore imports as the Philippines is likely to be able to meet the demand, although China’s high nickel ore stocks may present a downside risk.

#### Philippines not Cuba is the only one who can fill in and provide substantial amounts of nickel.

Roskill 14

(Jan. 21, Roskill Information Services Ltd. of London, UK is a leading provider of multi-client and bespoke market research services to the minerals and metals industry, <http://www.sacbee.com/2014/01/21/6088146/indonesias-nickel-ban-not-set.html>, “Indonesia's Nickel ban not set in Stone”, twm)

jjj

International pressures may also conspire to effect a change in the policy. The Philippines is expected to the main winner in the upheaval of the nickel market, with the country representing the only other large-scale source of lateritic ore. Volumes of nickel ore exports from the Philippines are expected to increase, but the low-grade of ore from the Philippines is ill-suited for use in China's modern rotary kiln electric furnaces . The use of the ore could increase production costs by as much as 30%, rendering the process economically unattractive to new producers even at prices as high as US$17,000/t, although existing producers may maintain production to minimise losses and honour supply agreements.

#### China will pressure Indonesia to lift the ban

Roskill 14

(Jan. 21, Roskill Information Services Ltd. of London, UK is a leading provider of multi-client and bespoke market research services to the minerals and metals industry, <http://www.sacbee.com/2014/01/21/6088146/indonesias-nickel-ban-not-set.html>, “Indonesia's Nickel ban not set in Stone”, twm)

On the flip-side, therefore, China's nickel pig iron and stainless steel industries are likely to emerge as the ban's biggest losers, aside from Indonesia's own treasury (in the near term). As such, the Chinese government may enter the political fray surrounding the nickel ban and attempt to effectuate an exemption for some of its companies, through diplomatic back-channels. Chinese-Indonesian relationships were normalised in 1990 and China has since grown to become Indonesia's second-largest trading partner, behind Japan, with bilateral trade expected to reach US$80 billion by 2015. Chinese companies also remain heavily invested in infrastructural development, and although it may wait to see the outcome of the Indonesia's presidential elections, Roskill expects that China may leverage its influence to secure the interests of its metal industries by securing additional transitional arrangements.

### Manufacturing

**No China-Russia war and even if one went nuclear, it wouldn’t cause extinction**

**Karlin 10** (8/17/10, Anatoly Karlin is a San Francisco based independent writer, political analyst and media critic. He is the author of the blog Sublime Oblivion focusing on the Russia, geopolitics and future global trends. “Why China and Russia won’t fight” <http://www.sublimeoblivion.com/2010/10/17/russia-china-no-war/>, nkj)

Every so often there appear claims, not only in the Western press but the Russian one, that (rising but overpopulated) China is destined to fight an (ailing and creaking) Russia for possession of its resources in the Far East\*. For reasons that should be obvious, this is almost completely implausible for the next few decades. But let’s spell them out nonetheless. 1. China regards India, Japan, and above all the USA as its prime potential enemies. This is tied in to its three geopolitical goals: (1) keep the country together and under CCP hegemony – an enterprise most threatened by its adversaries stirring up ethnic nationalism (India – Tibetans, Turkey – Uyghurs) or buying the loyalties of the seaboard commercial elites (Japan, USA), (2) returning Taiwan into the fold and (3) acquiring hegemony over the South China Sea and ensuring the security of the sea routes supplying it with natural resources. The major obstacles to the latter two are the “dangerous democracies” of Japan and India, with the US hovering in the background. In contrast, the northern border is considered secure, and more generally, Russia and Central Asia are seen as sources of natural resource supplies that are more secure than the oceanic routes. 2. But let’s ignore all that. It’s true that in a purely conventional war, it is now very likely that Russia will not be able to defend its Far East possessions thanks to China’s (mostly complete) qualitative equalization, (very substantial) quantitative superiority, and (huge) positional advantage. Short of the US and Japan interfering – which is unlikely, if not impossible if Russia were to make big concessions (e.g. on Kuriles ownership, rights to the Siberian resource base) – defeat and occupation are assured. BUT… This ignores the all-important nuclear dimension. In the wake of post-Soviet demilitarization, it has become clear that any war with either NATO or China would likely end up going nuclear. The official military doctrine allows for the use of nuclear weapons against other nuclear powers in defense against conventional attack; post-Soviet military exercises explicitly model usage of tactical nukes to blunt enemy spearheads as Russian military formations beat a scorched-earth retreat. Though the quantity of Russia’s tactical nukes is now substantially smaller than their 16,000 peak, there are still probably thousands of them remaining (unlike strategic platforms these are not subject to inspection and verification procedures), and it’s difficult to see how a Chinese invasion could effectively counter them. (But why would the Russians use nukes on their own territory, one might ask? The Russian Far East is very lightly populated, and in any case air bursts – which is presumably what they’ll be using against the enemy divisions – produce little radioactive fallout). 3. Aleksandr Khramchikhin goes on to argue that: … Unfortunately, nuclear weapons don’t guarantee salvation either, since China also has them. Yes, at the time we have superiority in strategic forces, but it’s rapidly diminishing. Furthermore we don’t have medium range missiles, but China has them, which almost makes null their inferiority in ICBM’s… What concerns a strategic nuclear exchange, then the Chinese potential is more than enough to destroy the main cities of European Russia, which they don’t need anyway (it has a lot of people and few resources). There’s a strong argument to be made that, understanding this, the Kremlin will not use nuclear weapons. Therefore nuclear deterrenece with respect to China is a complete myth. This is wrong on most points: (A) As far as is known, China maintains a position of limited deterrence, its nuclear forces being constantly modernized but remaining small in comparison with those of the US and Russia (this may or may not change in the future). The big post-Soviet decline in Russia’s arsenal has largely run itself out and on recent trends is unlikely to resume. This shouldn’t be surprising, since Russia no doubt realizes that it is precisely its nuclear forces that do most to guarantee its current day security. (B) Apart from the fact that China’s medium-range rocket forces still can’t reach deep into European Russia, even accounting for them it is still very much inferior to Russia: “In July 2010 the Russian strategic forces were estimated to have 605 strategic delivery platforms, which can carry up to 2667 nuclear warheads.” As of 2010, China is estimated to have (non-MIRVed) 90 intercontinental ballistic missiles (i.e. can reach European Russian cities) and a few hundreds of medium and short range ballistic missiles. The latter will comprehensively devastate the populated regions of the Russian Far East, and to a lesser extent east of the Urals, but these aren’t core Russian territories and have relatively small concentrations of population and industry. In any case, if anything these are likely to be used not against Siberian cities, but against Russian military and strategic objects. (C) One must also include ballistic missile defense, civil defense and geography into the equation. Though China has more S-300 type missile systems and has recently demonstrated an ability to shoot down ballistic missiles in controlled tests, there is little doubt that Russia is still ahead in this sphere. The S-400 now replacing the S-300 has intrinsic anti-ICBM capabilities, and the A-135 system around Moscow – with its nuclear-tipped interceptor missiles – makes it better than even odds that the capital would survive intact. Both China and Russia have substantial civil defense measures. The USSR in 1986 had shelter space for around 11.2% of its urban population, according to CIA estimates. As of 2001, it was estimated to be 50% in Moscow, and construction of bunkers continues. China too has a large-scale civil defense plan of building bunkers in its larger cities. At first glance, it would appear that geography-wise, China has an advantage in its huge population, large size, and greater rural population as a percentage of the whole. In contrast, Russia’s population is largely urban, and seemingly more vulnerable. This however is misleading. Most of China’s population, fertile land and industry is concentrated on its eastern seaboard and along its great river valleys. Agricultural productivity will plummet in the years following a large-scale exchange, resulting in famine, and as so often in Chinese history, perhaps anarchy and the end of political dynasties – in this case the CCP. Even if the Russian Far East is “won” in time, it is unlikely that it could alleviate the suddenly critical population pressures, for building up the infrastructure for mass human accommodation in that cold, barren and mountainous will take decades. Since Russian agriculture happens over a greater area, is less intensive / reliant on machinery and fertilizer inputs, and generates a substantial export surplus in most year, it isn’t as likely as China to dip into all out famine. (D) As things stand, the real result of a nuclear war between Russia and China would be (1) a crippled Russia with 20-30 million fewer people, with many tens of millions more at the edge of subsistence, shorn of its Far East territories, but with an intact state still endowed with a nuclear deterrent, and (2) a collapsed and c.90% deindustrialized China rapidly descending into mass famine and anarchy and knocked out of the Great Power game for the foreseeable future. Two tragic, but nonetheless distinguishable, postwar environments, as Herman Kahn would have said. 4. Obviously Chinese strategists comprehend these arguments, and as such cannot have any serious medium-term designs on Russian territory. This is not the case for Taiwan and the South China Sea, where Chinese interests are greater, and don’t fundamentally infringe on US security to the extent that it will contemplate using its far superior nuclear arsenal against China, as that would risk Los Angeles and San Francisco and a dozen other cities on the West Coast getting annihilated. This fulfills the main purpose of China’s long-range “minimal deterrence” strategy. 5. The strategic balance isn’t fixed in stone, and future developments may make the situation more precarious by 2030-50: (1) The development of truly effective ABM systems, (2) growing sustanance pressures in China due to climate change and the depletion of coal reserves, and (3) the opening of the Russian Far East and Siberian interiors to intensive settlement thanks to global warming. But this remains speculation, and the facts are that since both Chinese and Russians are more or less rational actors, the chances of large-scale war between them in the next few decades is very close to zero – no matter what the sensationalists claim.

#### CCP is resilient

Kurlantzick 11— Fellow at the USC School of Public Diplomacy and the Pacific Council on International Policy. Frmr visiting scholar in the China program at Carnegie. (Joshua, Beijing has bought itself a respite from middle class revolt, 7 March 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/beijing-has-bought-itself-a-respite-from-middle-class-revolt?pageCount=0)

As governments across North Africa have been overthrown or are seemingly near the verge of collapse, some Chinese writers and activists are hopeful that this democratic wave might sweep over the world's largest and most powerful authoritarian state. Unknown Chinese activists have anonymously posted an online manifesto calling for their own "Jasmine Revolution". Groups of protesters - even joined by the American ambassador to China - have gathered in Beijing to heed the call for revolt. The Chinese authorities, taking no chances, **quickly shut down protests** and apparently jailed some of the demonstrators. They have also been blocking any internet discussion of activists' "Jasmine Manifesto".

But despite Beijing's quick response, in reality China's leadership has far less to fear than Hosni Mubarak or Muammar Qaddafi. For one thing, unlike in many parts of the Middle East, **China's urbanised centres haven't turned against the regime.** Instead, most city residents essentially support, or at least tolerate, the regime. And why not? The government has been very, very good to them, as Minxin Pei, a professor at Claremont McKenna College, documented in his book China's Trapped Transition.

After the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the Chinese Communist Party, recognising the power of educated urban protesters, delivered a raft of new incentives to co-opt the urban middle class. The government directed growth to urban areas, and launched other pro-middle class programmes. These included higher salaries for academics and other professionals; restrictions on rural people's housing and schools so that peasants cannot attend many of the best urban institutions; and opening the Party to membership for entrepreneurs, many of whom eagerly joined as a business networking opportunity. The Party reinforces the middle class content with the status quo by using speeches and state media to suggest that, in a democracy, total freedom of movement would allow rural peasants to swamp the cities, ruining the standard of living in wealthier urban areas.

All these incentives are reasons why Chinese city residents in polls show high appreciation of the current state of affairs. In one recent survey, nearly 90 per cent of Chinese expressed satisfaction with the current station of their nation; since these polls, conducted by telephone, are focused on urban areas, they represent more closely the views of the urban middle class.

China's leaders also are not as out of touch, isolated or brittle as some of those in the Middle East. The Communist Party may be an authoritarian regime and there is certainly plenty of corruption - one Chinese scholar estimates that corruption costs China more than $80 billion (Dh294 billion) in growth each year. Still, the leadership now is a collective one, and no single official amasses the type of enormous wealth of leaders like Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. China's collective leadership, unlike in Mao's time, also has some ability to listen to and respond to public opinion. In 2008, for example, protests in Tibet initially were met by a relatively moderate response from the central government. But angry online sentiment - the Chinese blogosphere is highly nationalist and often conservative - partly prompted a tougher crackdown, according to Chinese officials and scholars.

Perhaps most importantly, unlike much of the Middle East, China's economy is booming, and not simply because of resource extraction. In Tunisia, and then in Egypt, protests erupted after immolations by young men and women who, although they had undergraduate degrees, were unable to find work in economies that could not keep pace with growing populations. Although Chinese university graduates certainly have a tougher time finding jobs than they did several years ago, the Chinese economy continues to boom: China grew by more than 9 per cent last year, during a global economic crisis, and will likely grow at least as much this year, a rate it has kept up for roughly three decades (the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, downgraded that to 7 per cent this week). Educated young men and women still can find high-paying jobs, particularly if they are willing to move to interior cities that have been prioritised by the central government.

And, unlike in places like Egypt, foreign powers such as the United States - which has sold roughly $2 trillion in government debt to China - do not have much leverage over the People's Republic. In the early 1990s, when China remained a global pariah because of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, America had more leverage to push Beijing on human rights and democracy, and President Bill Clinton, during a visit to the country, publicly and harshly criticised China's record on rights.

Today, the story is much different. Dependent on China not only to keep the American economy propped up but also for cooperation on global issues like trade and climate change, the Obama administration has taken a much softer approach to Beijing. When Barack Obama headed to China for the first time as president in the fall of 2009, he agreed to a "press conference" with the Chinese president Hu Jintao at which the two actually took no questions, and when the American president held a town forum with Chinese students, he delivered none of the broadsides against China's rights record that his predecessor had.

Any change that happens in China in the future is going to come from domestic events, not from external pressure. **But don't expect that change to happen anytime soon.**

#### Chinese engagement with Latin America is trending upwards – it’s key to CCP export markets and energy imports

Myers and Hongbo 13 (Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue, Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, each answering a question from the Inter-American Dialogue “How 'Strategically Important' Is Latin America for China?” http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3210)

A: Margaret Myers, director of the China and Latin America program at the Inter-American Dialogue: "Latin America became a strategically important market for Chinese exporters a few years ago following decreases in demand for Chinese goods from Europe and the United States. Chinese exports to Europe fell 9 percent in 2011 in comparison with export levels in 2010, for example, and exports to the United States fell 5 percent. As U.S. and European demand continues to lag, Latin American nations should expect sustained interest in their markets and new market- and efficiency-seeking investments. As China continues its process of industrial upgrading, Latin America will also see more in the way of high-tech goods, as well as marketing of distinctly Chinese brands. Chinese cars are already being sold in several Latin American countries, including Brazil, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. And Chinese cell phones and computers are increasingly popular among Latin American consumers. As the former LAC director general at China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yang is uniquely familiar with both the promises and pitfalls of trade with Latin America. While Latin America remains an appealing market for exports, Chinese producers and officials are painfully aware of growing protectionism in response to China's market-seeking endeavors. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences cited nationalization and trade protectionism trends among the top 20 notable events in the region in 2012. China expects to avoid protectionist measures by building mutually beneficial, 'win-win' trade relations. Chinese government and commercial entities in Latin America will indeed be working to build stronger trade relations in the coming years." A: Sun Hongbo, associate professor at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing: "China regards Latin America as a promising strategic trade partner not only for diversifying export destinations, but also for safeguarding commodity import security. According to official statistics, Chinese exports to Latin America represented 6.74 percent of its total exports for the first nine months of 2012. Compared to the United States, European Union and Asia, Latin America has absorbed a marginal share of China's fast export expansion. From 2003 to 2011, the region's share of China's export volume only rose from 2.71 percent to 6.41 percent. Chinese policymakers expect to build a more sustainable and balanced trade relationship with Latin America. This issue has been widely negotiated both in political and commercial circles from the two sides. However, the bilateral effort still needs to find an efficient way to achieve satisfactory results, particularly for those countries that have a trade deficit with China. China continues to increase its imports from Latin America-with the region supplying 3.62 percent of China's total imports in 2003 to 7.13 percent in 2012. China's slowdown in 2012 caused serious concern in commodity-exporting countries in South America. Nonetheless, Chinese trade with Latin America in 2012 is estimated at more than $250 billion, higher than the year prior. Chinese business groups will attach great importance to the market volume in Latin America, but the export opportunities will also depend on strong economic growth in this region. In 2013, China's highlighted macroeconomic policy device for sustaining stable growth is to accelerate the pace of high-quality urbanization, which will necessitate increasing imports of mineral, agricultural and energy products from Latin America."

#### Bolstering US influence pushes China out – Columbia proves it determines contracts

Ellis 12

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At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of the PRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts often suggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumed desire to “keep China out” ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America’s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chinese initiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship with the United ¶ States. Colombia’s close relationship with the United States, for ¶ example, made the military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from the PRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a “bad” relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a “positive” relationship with China has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversify away from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation’s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expanded participation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 prompted Venezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8s after ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

#### China’s exports are key to a sustainable economy – recent shocks mean it’s on the brink

Holland 7/9 (Tom, writer of the South China Morning Post’s Monitor column, internally citing statistics from ADBI, the Asian Development Bank Institute, Dr. Yuqing Xing, professor of economics an director of Asian economic policy at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, PhD in economics from the University of Illinois—Urbana-Champaign, MA and BA from Peking University, South China Morning Post Monitor, July 9, 2013, “Despite rebalancing, exports still vitally important to China,” <http://www.scmp.com/business/article/1278239/despite-rebalancing-exports-still-vitally-important-china>, alp)

Unfortunately, the figure for gross exports isn't much use either. In an economy where all the value of all exports was produced domestically, then gross exports would give a good idea of external demand. But real supply chains don't work like that. Chinese factories import flash memory chips from Japan, displays from Korea and processors from the United States, which they then assemble into smartphones for sale around the world. So although the face value of China's exports may be high, the value added by China's factories is often relatively low. But although gross exports aren't much help in gauging the true importance of external demand, net exports don't work either. If all China's imports were components destined for re-export, the net figure would do the trick. But they aren't. Imports are also consumed domestically, not least by Chinese buying their own smartphones. To estimate the real contribution of external demand, we would have to account for the proportion of China's imports destined for re-export after assembly. Although these processing imports have fallen relative to China's total imports over recent years, as the first chart shows, they still make up a sizeable share of China's overall inbound goods trade. In an attempt to do exactly that, Xing Yuqing and Manisha Pradhananga at the Asian Development Bank Institute have come up with a measure of external demand which strips out China's processing imports. Then, for good measure, they have factored in an allowance for foreign direct investment into China, which remains driven largely by external, rather than domestic, demand. They found that although the share of external demand in China's GDP has fallen from its high of 28 per cent reached in 2007, in 2011 it still accounted for 22 per cent of overall economic output. As the second chart shows, that's 10 times as great as the share implied by the net export figure commonly used by economists. Xing and Pradhananga conclude that despite efforts to rebalance the economy towards domestic consumption, China is still heavily dependent on demand from the rest of the world, and that its growth remains highly vulnerable to external shocks. In other words, if tomorrow's trade numbers are as dismal as many analysts expect, it will be an ominous sign indeed for China's growth outlook.

#### We control the biggest internal link to their impacts

Abebe et al 10

[Dan – Prof Law @ U of C Law. “International Agreements, Internal Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The “Two Chinas” Problem” The Virginia Journal of Intl Law, Vol 50. Winter 2010 ln]

First, since the collapse of the Marxist-Leninist ideology that served as the basis for the party's authority, the CCP has adopted economic growth as the central justification for its one-party rule. The CCP has pegged its political future to a type of "performance legitimacy" n12 - it governs because it can provide faster growth and higher standards of living than any alternative form of central authority. In Eastern China, the CCP's approach has been a nearly unqualified success. Special coastal economic zones, favorable banking policies, and massive decentralization of government have combined to spur blistering economic growth. Western China, however, has been left starkly behind: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in Western China is less than half of what it is in Eastern China. The result has been rising income inequality, social instability, and dramatic divisions between East and West, rural and city, and peasants and urban residents, along with the creation of a roaming underclass of Western Chinese seeking work in the coastal cities. n13 Worse still, these social schisms coincide with ethnic and religious fault lines: Western China is home to many ethnic minority groups that harbor substantial animosity toward CCP rule. Poorer conditions in the West have created the political environment for the emergence of separatist movements. Brisk economic growth in Western China has thus become a political imperative for the CCP, and the CCP has [\*330] prioritized it accordingly. China is likely to balk at any international agreement that might imperil this growth. Second, as a result of its growth-driven delegation of power, the CCP suffers from a surprising (for such a centralized government) erosion of state capacity: the provinces often ignore the central government's directives, frequently without meaningful consequences. n14 The political structure of the CCP and the institutional structure of China's government are sometimes overlapping or redundant and, in many places, lack effective vertical or horizontal accountability. The environmental regulatory agencies are often subordinate to the very agencies they are intended to regulate. Province-level CCP officials are often evaluated (both locally and in Beijing) by their ability to produce high levels of economic growth, not their commitment to environmental protection. Although the CCP has recently tried to recentralize power and rationalize the governance structure, n15 the center's capacity to enforce environmental regulations on the provinces is much weaker than in a typical industrialized state. The existing structural relationship between the provinces and Beijing often results in a chronic inability on the part of the CCP to provide public goods like environmental protection, an inability it will not be able to reverse without incurring substantial costs. Finally, there is reason to believe that the vast majority of economic and scientific projections have substantially underestimated China's future carbon emissions by failing to account for heterogeneity among provinces. Eastern China is already highly industrialized and reasonably wealthy; there is every reason to expect that it will begin to move towards cleaner technologies and shift economic production away from industry and towards services (which are generally less energy and carbon-intensive). n16 Western China, by contrast, is poorer and more agrarian, and the typical development pattern for such an area involves a shift towards greater industrialization and higher per capita energy consumption (and carbon production). Indeed, this is precisely the direction in which Western China is moving. n17 Every quantitative forecast of Chinese emissions - save for two important exceptions - uses only national-level data, a methodological weakness that can wash out distinctions between East and West. Of the [\*331] two studies that employ sub-national data, one projects higher emissions than any of the national-level studies; the other projects much higher emissions than any other study. n18 We read this as suggesting that Chinese carbon emissions over the forthcoming several decades may be significantly greater than the standard models have anticipated, with correspondingly higher costs to China from any agreement to curb carbon emissions. In light of the importance of economic growth to the CCP, the internal structure of Chinese governance, and the need to develop Western China, the prospects for China choosing to join such an agreement in the immediate future seem slim. This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I focuses on the general importance of economic growth to the CCP, the distribution of growth within China, and the social and economic difficulties generated by the CCP's hyper-growth policies. Part II analyzes the CCP's internal environmental enforcement capacity and argues that China would encounter substantial domestic challenges in implementing a climate accord, even if it chooses to sign one. Part III critiques the assumptions underlying quantitative forecasts of Chinese carbon emissions and suggests that future emissions may exceed conventional projections by substantial margins. Part IV canvasses extant potential frameworks for an international climate change agreement and argues that they are likely to be unsuitable to one or more of the relevant parties. Our conclusion is a pessimistic one: it will be difficult to convince China to join a meaningful international climate agreement in the near future under the best of circumstances. The Two Chinas, coupled with China's internal political dynamics, present circumstances that are hardly ideal. I. The Chinese Growth Imperative Modern China has reinvented itself on a foundation of kudzu-like economic growth. Where Marxism once served as the unifying national ideology, the CCP has substituted wealth generation and prosperity as the touchstones of the regime and suggested that the Chinese people judge the legitimacy of CCP rule by the increases in their own standards of living. Economic growth in China has been spectacular, but it has also been highly uneven. Eastern, coastal provinces have become wealthy, while central and western provinces have lagged far behind. In effect, there is no longer simply "China." There is now Eastern China, which is urban, industrialized, and relatively prosperous, and Western China, [\*332] which is rural, agrarian, and relatively poor. This divergence in economic outcomes - a divergence that in places coincides with pre-existing ethnic and religious fault lines - poses a serious threat to social stability within China. n19 In response, the CCP has begun an aptly named "Western Development Program" in an attempt to prioritize economic growth, encourage national integration, and curb nationalist unrest in Western provinces. Accordingly, the governing regime will be reluctant to join a climate agreement that might contribute to greater instability by stunting crucial economic development in Western China. A. Foundations of CCP Rule: Economic Growth Since 1949, China has been governed by the autocratic CCP, dominated by Chairman Mao's conception of Marxism and designed to bring "socialist glory" to China while preserving party rule. After the Cultural Revolution and Mao's death in 1976, however, the CCP, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to move away from the Marxist ideological foundation that served as the legitimating discursive force for CCP authority. n20 Concerned with increasing levels of apathy toward communism and questions about its efficacy as the governing regime, n21 the CCP turned to two new sources of authority and legitimacy to galvanize support among the populace and strengthen its hold on power. The first of these was a new Chinese nationalism. The second was an emphasis on continued economic growth - a type of "performance legitimacy" n22 - as a benchmark and measure of the regime's success. From the late 1970s until the suppression of student-led democratic protests in Tiananmen Square in 1989, Deng and the CCP moved slowly toward a reform of China's centralized economic policies and internal governance structure. Deng and some of the reformers began to argue that the Chinese people wanted a higher standard of living, technological dynamism, and economic efficiency, not more ideology and excessive bureaucracy. To be economically successful, they argued, China needed the CCP's one-party rule to ensure stability and regain international prestige. In the words of one scholar, "in the most fundamental sense ... China's economic reform strategy has been guided by a strategic [\*333] vision at the top of the political system. This vision links China's security, global influence, and domestic stability to the state of its economy." n23 Sustained economic growth is paramount for the continuation of the CCP, the maintenance of China's territorial integrity, and the pursuit of China's national interests in international politics. n24 The CCP's reform strategy has been marked by incremental opening of the domestic economy, beginning with agriculture in the late 1970s and continuing through China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. n25 During the 1980s, the CCP delegated a significant amount of authority from the central government to the provinces and cities, freeing local actors - province and city-level officials - to develop policies that encouraged economic growth independent of the center. n26 After a temporary delay in reforms after Tiananmen Square, the 1990s saw the CCP commit to the creation of a market system, the privatization of some state-owned enterprises, and the development of the private sector. At the turn of the century, the CCP began to embrace private entrepreneurs and "retreat from economic administration to economic regulation as the core economic function of government." n27 From a national perspective, the CCP's economic reforms are an unqualified success. Fueled by these reforms, the Chinese economy has produced tremendous economic growth and a rapidly improving standard of living for many of China's citizens (in addition to severe consequences for the environment). Between 1978 and 2000, "overall per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in constant yuan roughly quadrupled." n28 Today, China has the world's second largest economy by purchasing power parity, surpassing Japan, India, and Germany. n29 It has the world's largest foreign capital reserves. n30 It enjoys a trade surplus of [\*334] $ 163.3 billion with the United States. n31 It is a leading destination for foreign direct investment, n32 and has become more integrated into the world economy through its membership in the WTO. By almost every economic measure, the CCP's economic policies and drive for modernization have produced tremendous aggregate gains for China and its citizens. The CCP's policies have also created a consumer society in the formerly Marxist China. From telephones to televisions, newspapers to the internet, and automobiles to overseas travel, the CCP has brought to the Chinese people access to information, goods, and technology that were unimaginable during the Maoist era. n33 The CCP's economic policies have reduced the role of the state in the affairs of daily life, leaving ordinary citizens more free to engage in social and economic activities. In so doing, the CCP has reinforced the norm that prioritizing hyper-growth polices and ensuring economic development are the party's overriding responsibilities. China is hardly unique in favoring continued economic growth; there are few nations on earth that are not attempting to grow their economies and produce wealth for their citizens. In China, however, economic growth is not merely a matter of policy. Growth, particularly in certain geographic regions, is viewed by the CCP as a political imperative, integral to the regime's survival. As subsequent discussion will demonstrate, this focus on economic growth significantly impacts the CCP's incentives to curb environmental degradation and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

**China favors concessions and peaceful resolution—regime instability and empirics**

**Asia Times 11** 1/27 (Sudha Ramachandran, “China plays long game on border disputes,” Jan 27, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA27Ad02.html, CJin)

A Sino-Tajik border agreement that was ratified recently by Tajikistan's parliament flies in the face of images of China being a "bullying" and "belligerent" power that "will go to any length to fulfill its territorial ambitions". The agreement, which resolves a 130-year-old territorial dispute, requires Tajikistan to cede around 1,000 square kilometers of land in the Pamir Mountains to China. It means that China will receive roughly 3.5% of the 28,000 square kilometers of land it laid claim to. China's territorial concession has been hailed by Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi as a "victory for Tajik diplomacy". **This is not the first time that China has made concessions to settle its territorial disputes.** Under its border agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, China received just 22% and 32% respectively of the land disputed with these countries. China's boundaries with Central Asia were originally drawn up under what China describes as "unequal treaties". It alleged that as a result of these treaties, Czarist Russia gained territory at its expense. It therefore refused to recognize these boundaries. Although the Soviet Union and China began negotiating a mutually acceptable border, a settlement remained elusive. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990, the new Central Asian Republics - Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - inherited the disputes with China. In the 1990s, China began negotiating settlements with these countries. Border agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were reached in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Border talks with Tajikistan were delayed by the civil war there. However, talks gathered momentum in the late 1990s and an agreement was reached in 2002. It was this agreement that was ratified recently. Analysts have drawn attention to the territorial concessions that China extended to resolve its many disputes. Of its 23 territorial disputes active since 1949, China offered "substantial compromises" in 17, usually agreeing "to accept less than half of the territory being disputed," M Taylor Fravel, associate professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pointed out in the article "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," published in the journal International Security. However, there is more to it than meets the eye. The territorial concessions that China is believed to have made are not quite as substantial as they appear to be. Srikanth Kondapalli, a China expert at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi pointed out that China's strategy of stepping up territorial claims and then settling for less has enabled it to appear to be making a major territorial concession to reach a border resolution agreement. In several disputes, "whether China actually gave up territory or made a substantial concession is a debatable question," he told Asia Times Online. Still, in the quest for regional stability China overall "has been liberal in border dispute resolution", he said. What has prompted Beijing to seek compromise and extend concessions with regard to territorial disputes involving its land borders? Regime insecurity appears to have been an important motivating factor. According to Fravel, "China's leaders have compromised when faced with internal threats to regime security - the revolt in Tibet, the instability following the Great Leap Forward, the legitimacy crisis after the Tiananmen upheaval, and separatist violence in Xinjiang." The territorial concessions it made to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in order to reach border agreements with them was prompted by a sharp surge in separatist violence in Xinjiang province in the early 1990s. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as independent republics stoked long-smoldering Uighur nationalism in Xinjiang and fueled Uighur aspirations for independence. This triggered apprehension in Beijing that Xinjiang would break away. Coming close on the heels of the Tiananmen uprising of 1989, which had undermined the Chinese government's legitimacy, the separatist violence in Xinjiang compounded Chinese regime insecurity, as it posed a threat to China's territorial integrity. This made it imperative for Beijing to nip Uighur unrest in the bud. China's strategy to deal with Uighur separatism has involved ruthless suppression of separatists and economic development of the Xinjiang region. However, the success of this strategy hinged on support from countries bordering Xinjiang - Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Their cooperation was essential to get them to crack down on Uighur separatists taking sanctuary on their soil as well as to build robust trade ties that were needed for economic development in Xinjiang. Beijing thus traded territorial concessions for support from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in its strategy to quell Uighur separatism. With the exception of its territorial disputes with India and Bhutan, China has settled all its other land-border disputes. In contrast, it has resolved none of its maritime border disputes, although the dispute in the Gulf of Tonkin with Vietnam is being discussed and those discussions are at an advanced stage of resolution. China's strategy for resolving its border disputes and the nature of its border-resolution mechanism provide useful pointers to what lies ahead. In the past, "it is when the contestant state is weak that China has moved quickly to resolve the dispute," points out Kondapalli. The way it went about handling its territorial disputes with the Soviet Union is indicative. Although China did discuss them with the Soviet Union, it was only when the USSR disintegrated that Beijing moved quickly to achieve resolution.

**No Chinese regional disputes escalate**

**Asia Times 11** 1/27 (Sudha Ramachandran, “China plays long game on border disputes,” Jan 27, 2011, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA27Ad02.html, CJin)

A Sino-Tajik border agreement that was ratified recently by Tajikistan's parliament flies in the face of images of China being a "bullying" and "belligerent" power that "will go to any length to fulfill its territorial ambitions". The agreement, which resolves a 130-year-old territorial dispute, requires Tajikistan to cede around 1,000 square kilometers of land in the Pamir Mountains to China. It means that China will receive roughly 3.5% of the 28,000 square kilometers of land it laid claim to. China's territorial concession has been hailed by Tajik Foreign Minister Hamrokhon Zarifi as a "victory for Tajik diplomacy". **This is not the first time that China has made concessions to settle its territorial disputes.** Under its border agreements with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for instance, China received just 22% and 32% respectively of the land disputed with these countries. China's boundaries with Central Asia were originally drawn up under what China describes as "unequal treaties". It alleged that as a result of these treaties, Czarist Russia gained territory at its expense. It therefore refused to recognize these boundaries. Although the Soviet Union and China began negotiating a mutually acceptable border, a settlement remained elusive. With the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1990, the new Central Asian Republics - Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan - inherited the disputes with China. In the 1990s, China began negotiating settlements with these countries. Border agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan were reached in 1996 and 1998 respectively. Border talks with Tajikistan were delayed by the civil war there. However, talks gathered momentum in the late 1990s and an agreement was reached in 2002. It was this agreement that was ratified recently. Analysts have drawn attention to the territorial concessions that China extended to resolve its many disputes. 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#### Even if the aff bolsters some areas of manufacturing, broad reshoring solves the entire advantage because it ensures a manufacturing renaissance – concessions on unionization, wage gaps, productivity increases, and logistics costs prove

Plumer 5/1 (Brad, reporter, former editor at the New Republic, cites Jay Parker, the president of Lenovo’s operations in North America, cites statistics from the Reshoring Initiative, an industry-led effort to bring jobs to the US, founded by Harry Moser, who sits on the board of the National Institute of Metalworking Skills, BS in Mechanical Engineering and MS from MIT, and an MBA from the University of Chicago, cites Scott Paul of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, The Washington Post, May 1, 2013, “Is U.S. manufacturing making a comeback – or is it just hype?,” <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/05/01/is-u-s-manufacturing-set-for-a-comeback-or-is-it-all-hype/>, alp)

It’s hardly news when a U.S. firm moves its manufacturing operations abroad to China. But what about when a Chinese company sets up a factory in the United States? That actually happened in January, when Lenovo, a Beijing-based computer maker, opened a new manufacturing line in Whitsett, N.C., to handle assembly of PCs, tablets, workstations and servers. The rationale? The company is expanding into the U.S. market and needs the flexibility to assemble units for speedy delivery across the country, says Jay Parker, Lenovo’s president for North America. But also – and this was crucial – the math added up. While it’s still cheaper to build things in China, those famously low Chinese wages have risen in recent years. “We reached the point where we could offset a portion of those labor costs by saving on logistics,” Parker says. U.S. firms that have long operated abroad are making similar moves: Caterpillar, GE and Ford are among those that have announced that they’re shifting some manufacturing operations back to the United States. And economists are now debating whether these stories are a blip – or whether they signal the beginning of a major renaissances for American manufacturing. It’s easy to be skeptical. So far, the effect on jobs has been modest. Since January 2010, the United States has added 520,000 manufacturing jobs – and of those, just 50,000 have come from overseas firms moving here, according to the Reshoring Initiative. (That includes 115 in the new Lenovo plant.) That’s a decent number, but it pales beside the 6 million factory jobs that the Bureau of Labor Statistics says vanished between 2000 and 2009. And all those reshoring anecdotes might just be that – isolated anecdotes. In March, Jan Hatzius of Goldman Sachs pored over the data on U.S. trade and manufacturing and found that the manufacturing gains since 2010 have mainly just been a cyclical bounce-back from the recession and nothing more. “Evidence for a structural renaissance is scant so far,” he wrote. Yet the optimists counter that the logic of a manufacturing comeback remains compelling. Besides the shrinking wage gap between China and the United States, the productivity of the American worker keeps rising. Shipping costs are rising, making outsourcing more costly. And the surge in shale gas drilling gives the United States a wealth of cheap domestic energy to bolster industries such as petrochemicals. All that could combine to make U.S. factories more competitive in the years ahead, not just with Europe and Japan, but with the manufacturing behemoth in China. This shift likely won’t mean the United States will have 19 million manufacturing workers again, the way it did in the 1980s. For one thing, automation is still a powerful force. And the types of jobs that come back will be very different from the ones that vanished. Still, any significant uptick in domestic manufacturing after a decades-long decline could bolster the economy and spur innovation. “I think it’s fair to say this hasn’t all registered in the data just yet,” says Scott Paul, the president of the Alliance for American Manufacturing, in response to Hatzius’ points. “But we’re starting to lay the groundwork where we’ll start to see a real effect three to 10 years from now.” So what does that groundwork look like? For many analysts, the narrowing of the wage gap between China and the United States is the most significant factor. China has been getting wealthier, and its factory workers are demanding ever-higher wages. Whereas the gap in labor costs between the two countries was about $17 per hour in 2006, that could shrink to as little as $7 per hour by 2015, says Dan North, an economist with Euler Hermes, a credit insurer that works with manufacturers. “If you’re a U.S. company and the advantage is only $7 per hour, suddenly it may be worth staying home,” North says. “If I stay here, I have lower inventory costs, lower transportation costs. I’m closer to my market, I can have higher-quality production and I can keep my technology.” This notion appears to be catching on. In a February 2012 survey from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), 37 percent of U.S. manufacturers with sales above $1 billion said they were considering shifting some production from China to the United States. The factors they pointed to were not only that wages and benefits were rising in China, but the country is also enacting stricter labor laws and experiencing more frequent labor disputes and strikes. “Companies are realizing it’s not as easy to do things in China as they thought,” says Hal Sirkin, a senior partner at Boston Consulting Group who has been predicting the convergence of labor costs since 2011. The flip side is that American workers are becoming more attractive – for a mix of reasons. Worker productivity has been rising steadily over the years. But also, BCG says, the decline of U.S. organized labor is luring some multinational corporations home, particularly to the nonunion South. Unions, for their part, have often responded by allowing wages to fall in order to keep jobs in the United States. Ford started bringing back production from China and Mexico after an agreement with the United Auto Workers let the company hire new “second-tier” workers at lower wages.

### Sino-Japanese relations strong.

Xinhua News 10 (Zhang Ning, Xinhua “China-Japan relations show signs of improvement: FM,” 12-17-2010, http://english.cntv.cn/20101217/105123.shtml)

BEIJING, Dec. 16 (Xinhua) -- Sino-Japanese relations have shown signs of improvement and development, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said Thursday. Jiang made the comment at a regular news briefing, attributing the improved ties to "the many meetings and contacts" between Chinese and Japanese leaders at multilateral occasions and the important consensuses they had reached. After a ship collision soured the bilateral ties, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan had briefly met in Hanoi ahead of the East Asian Summit and on the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Meeting in Brussels. "Attaching great importance to the bilateral relations, China is willing to work with Japan to promote the mutually strategic relationship to new highs," Jiang said. Both sides should act in accordance with the principles of the four political documents, and maintain the healthy and stable development of the relationship, she said. The four political documents, namely the China-Japan Joint Statement on Comprehensively Advancing Strategic and Reciprocal Relations, the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the China-Japan Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration, serve as the bedrock for developing friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries. China is willing to strengthen cooperation with Japan in security dialogue and step up mutual trust, Jiang said. She confirmed that China and Japan would hold their 12th security dialogue in Beijing in the near future. Two Japanese Coast Guard patrol ships and a Chinese trawler collided on Sept. 7 in waters off the Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea, and Japan illegally detained the trawler's captain. China halted bilateral exchanges at and above the provincial and ministerial levels and suspended talks on expanding aviation services between the two countries.

#### It’s inevitable

Khan 7/24 (Mubin S., Special Correspondent of New Age, a leading Bangladeshi newspaper, graduate of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, The Guardian, July 24, 2013, “US manufacturing and the troubled promise of reshoring,” <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/24/us-manufacturing-troubled-promise-reshoring>, alp)

The buzz has been growing to a point of headiness: American giants including Apple, General Electric, Ford, Chrysler, Whirlpool, Lenovo and Caterpillar have all started setting up new plants or reinvesting in old plants in the US. The Boston Consulting Group predicted that up to 5 million manufacturing and related service jobs will be returning by 2020." The White House promised last year that major American companies like Ford will invest $16bn at home and add 12,000 jobs in the US by 2015. The president praised companies like Master Lock for revitalizing America's economy. "Right now we have an excellent opportunity to bring manufacturing back – but we have to seize it," the president said last year.

#### The industry’s empirically resilient—51 years of embargo disprove this aff; we can just import nickel elsewehre

WSJ 11 (Wall Street Journal. 2/25/11. "The Truth About U.S. Manufacturing."online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703652104576122353274221570.html.html#articleTabs%3Darticle)

Is American manufacturing dead? You might think so reading most of the nation's editorial pages or watching the endless laments in the news that "nothing is made in America anymore," and that our manufacturing jobs have vanished to China, Mexico and South Korea. Yet the empirical evidence tells a different story–of a thriving and growing U.S. manufacturing sector, and a country that remains **by far** the world's largest manufacturer. This is a particularly sensitive topic in my hometown of Flint, Mich., where auto-plant closings have meant lost jobs and difficult transitions for the displaced. But while it's true that the U.S. has lost more than seven million manufacturing jobs since the late 1970s, our manufacturing output has **continued to expand.** International data compiled by the United Nations on global output from 1970-2009 show this success story. Excluding recession-related decreases in 2001 and 2008-09, America's manufacturing output has continued to increase since 1970. In every year since 2004, manufacturing output has exceeded $2 trillion (in constant 2005 dollars), twice the output produced in America's factories in the early 1970s. Taken on its own, U.S. manufacturing would rank today as the sixth largest economy in the world, just behind France and ahead of the United Kingdom, Italy and Brazil. In 2009, the most recent full year for which international data are available, our manufacturing output was $2.155 trillion (including mining and utilities). That's more than 45% higher than China's, the country we're supposedly losing ground to. Despite recent gains in China and elsewhere, the U.S. still produced more than 20% of global manufacturing output in 2009. The truth is that America still makes a lot of stuff, and we're making more of it than ever before. We're merely able to do it with a fraction of the workers needed in the past. Consider the incredible, increasing productivity of America's manufacturing workers: The average U.S. factory worker is responsible today for more than $180,000 of annual manufacturing output, triple the $60,000 in 1972. Increases in productivity are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, such as GM's next generation Ecotec engine. These increases are a direct result of capital investments in productivity-enhancing technology, which last year helped boost output to record levels in industries like computers and semiconductors, medical equipment and supplies, pharmaceuticals and medicine, and oil and natural-gas equipment.

#### Alt causes – robotic automation, poor education, no high skilled workers

* Proves CIR turns the case

Khan 7/24 (Mubin S., Special Correspondent of New Age, a leading Bangladeshi newspaper, graduate of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, The Guardian, July 24, 2013, updated to correct some figures on 8/1, “US manufacturing and the troubled promise of reshoring,” <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/24/us-manufacturing-troubled-promise-reshoring>, alp)

It's not just the Chinese who are perceived as a threat. It's a very real risk that robots are taking American jobs. New manufacturing plants in the US may translate into more jobs for robots than humans. Kathryn Harrigan, a professor at the Columbia Business School, says many companies relied for too long on cheap human labor instead of splashing out large amounts of money on automating their factories. "Now that some of that competitive advantage has eroded and automation is even cheaper," Harrigan said. "They are simply completing the transition that would have taken place earlier." Automated factories, however, require highly skilled workers, often with training in technology and computers. The US, with declining graduation rates, may not have a rich supply of such workers. "If we want American kids to get those jobs, then we will have to restructure our education system," Harrigan said. Experts say that with structural changes in education and infrastructure, America can probably gain further competitive advantage and stay a leader in the industries of the future – biotechnology, nanotechnology, wind power, aerospace, next generation automobiles – especially in comparison to countries of similar economic stature. That will take time, however, and the White House, Congress and corporate community have not made much progress on that front.

#### Reshoring doesn’t solve competitiveness – low skill and job redistribution – if anything, it’s bad

* Offshoring creates large domestic markets abroad that benefit trade/multinationals and create an export market for expensive goods

Speakman 12 (Colin, Director of China Programs at CAPA International Education, president of the Council on China Exchange, former Senior Vice President/Global Director of Partnership Programs at the American Institute for Foreign Study, master’s degree from the London School of Economics and Political Science, contributing writer for China Daily, China Daily, August 15, 2012, “Outsourcing is not that bad for US,” <http://www.chinadailyapac.com/article/outsourcing-not-bad-us>, alp)

Put more generally, where in a typical American multinational company's mission statement do the words "we strive to protect US jobs at all costs" appear? It is more likely for us to find "we aim to consistently provide a high return to our shareholders" and if that means switching employment between countries to increase profits, so be it. A clue is in the words "American multinational"; such companies have responsibilities toward their global workforce and, let's face it, the world needs jobs. Travel back a couple of decades and you will see a graph of the supply source that resembles an hour glass fallen on its side when it comes to US industries like footwear and toys. The left axis would start showing sourced from China as low down and sourced from elsewhere outside then US (South Korea for example) high up, but as the years pass, China rises and the other sources fall. It is not so much outsourcing itself that has suddenly been discovered, but that so much of it has been aggregated in China in the last decade. Is that change so bad? Are 5 million jobs outsourced a million each to five countries any less of a job loss than the whole 5 million outsourced to one? The primary advantage of one foreign country growing a higher income domestic market is that it provides opportunities for overseas domestic sales on a bigger scale than if dispersed across many countries, and thus an opportunity for American companies beyond the importing of goods to the US. Do Americans want those low-wage basic jobs back now? Probably not, despite the idea that rising labor costs in China may make re-shoring possible. It is more likely that those jobs would be resourced to western China where labor costs are lower, or to Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos or Vietnam. If we look far enough ahead, China and its neighbors will face the outsourcing pressure as their labor costs rise, and the Middle East and Africa could become the new home of low-cost historic manufacturing. All this means that the low-cost seeking job outsourcing is not the battle that US politicians should be looking to win. The important battlefield will be the next generation of higher skilled, higher added-value jobs in the innovative and increasingly green industries. Solar power, wind turbines, alternative fuel vehicles, healthcare technological advances and other cutting edge areas are seen as the preserve of the advanced Western economies, especially the US with its high quality universities, support for research and development and tradition of thinking outside the box. They are the great hope of innovation driven industrial development. But guess what? China wants those jobs too. We know China wants to move from the "made in China" to "created in China" stage and to raise the living standards of its people by getting them into higher skilled jobs. China already has taken a lead in solar and wind power and is the US' major competitor in new industries. If Americans are to have confidence in a future with plentiful well-paid jobs, their politicians need to start outlining how the US can compete for those jobs rather than how it can reclaim the old outsourced jobs.

**U.S. manufacturing is resurgent---slew of factors make it sustainable and immune to a double-dip**

**PWC ‘12** [September 21st, 2012, Pricewaterhouse Coopers, “A Homecoming For U.S. Manufacturing?” <http://www.manufacturing.net/articles/2012/09/a-homecoming-for-us-manufacturing?et_cid=2861124&et_rid=279915960&linkid=http%3a%2f%2fwww.manufacturing.net%2farticles%2f2012%2f09%2fa-homecoming-for-us-manufacturing>]

#### NEW YORK― Consensus views on a U.S. manufacturing resurgence have largely centered on rising labor costs in markets such as China as the key driver of re-shoring back to the U.S. However, a new PwC US report, A Homecoming for U.S. Manufacturing?, reveals that while rising labor costs are part of the story, a range of factors—including transportation and energy costs and protecting the supply chain—could drive a sustained manufacturing renaissance in the U.S. beyond any cyclical recovery, potentially improving investment, employment, production output and research & development (R&D). PwC’s new report identifies seven factors—including transportation and energy costs; currency fluctuations; U.S. market demand; labor costs; U.S. talent; availability of capital; and the tax and regulatory climate—as the primary catalysts influencing manufacturers' decisions to establish production facilities domestically and produce products closer to their major customer bases. PwC's report also notes that localizing production can mitigate supply chain disruptions, which totaled $2.2 billion in financial impact for U.S. industrial products companies in 2011. “The reviving industrial manufacturing sector is instrumental to U.S. economic recovery,” said Bob McCutcheon, PwC’s U.S. Industrial Products leader. “Beyond the cyclical rebound, however, a host of structural changes is emerging that may lead to the U.S. becoming an important location for basing production and R&D facilities for several industries. In addition to trends in labor costs, other factors include the need to reduce transportation and energy costs; the emergence of the U.S. as a more attractive exporter and the relative attractiveness of the U.S. markets.”

No impact to the collapse of Manufacturing

Mead 12 [Walter Russel Mead, PhD, Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College Walter Russel, “Manufacturing Fallacy Debunked,”]

#### The fetishization of manufacturing is a persistent delusion in modern American politics. The media and the airwaves offer no shortage of doomsayers bemoaning the fact that America “doesn’t make anything anymore” and that the shift to a service economy is leaving millions in the dust. Instead of making tangible products of real value, they argue, Americans will be reduced to mere desk jockeys while machines (or foreigners) build things. At Via Meadia, we’ve largely considered this fear overblown—creative “service” jobs offer real intellectual challenge and stimulation. In an excellent new column at the Financial Times, John Kay takes on the manufacturing fetish: When you look at the value chain of manufactured goods we consume today, you quickly appreciate how small a proportion of the value of output is represented by the processes of manufacturing and assembly. Most of what you pay reflects the style of the suit, the design of the iPhone, the precision of the assembly of the aircraft engine, the painstaking pharmaceutical research, the quality assurance that tells you products really are what they claim to be. . . . Many of those who talk about the central economic importance of manufactured goods do so from an understandable concern for employment and the trade balance. Where will the jobs come from in a service-based economy, manufacturing fetishists ask? From doing here the things that cannot be done better elsewhere, either because of the particularity of the skills they require, or because these activities can only be performed close to home. Manufacturing was once a principal source of low-skilled employment but this can no longer be true in advanced economies. Most unskilled jobs in developed countries are necessarily in personal services. Workers in China can assemble your iPhone but they cannot serve you lunch, collect your refuse or bathe your grandmother. Anyone who thinks these are not “real jobs” does not understand the labour they involve. There is a subtle gender issue here: work that has historically mostly been undertaken by women at home – like care and cooking – struggles to be regarded as “real work”. This is exactly right. Design, creativity, service and style are how people will be making a living in the future. People once thought that the only people who produced anything of real worth were farmers, and that urban artisans and all others were mere parasites. This is an exact parallel to the current ridiculous ideas about manufacturing. The world became almost infinitely richer as farming shrank in terms of employment and its share of GDP; the same will happen as the Manufacturing Age sinks into the past.

# 2NC

### 2NC Condo Good Drop

**They’re out of constructives—Condo’s key to argument innovation—debaters will just read their crutch kritik if they are restricted to one world—a backup strategy incentivizes research because we can introduce other strategies without losing if the strategy comes up short—key to research skills—that outweighs—only portable skill—researching multiple angles will be necessary in any life pursuit**

**Turns policymaking, advocacy skills, and education—we only have a limited number of debates vs. any aff—multiple options causes a broader test of policy desirability**

**Advocacy Construction—contradictory worlds force defense of the middle-ground through specific solvency deficits—prevents ideological extremism and solves advocacy skills**

**Skew inevitable—DAs and T**

**Judge is a referee—potential abuse is not a voter—causes substance crowd out—perms, 2NR choice, and spreading drills check abuse and education**

### 2NC – Overview (China econ) (0:20)

#### The CCP has meticulously planned Chinese growth to account for slowdowns, but they require exports to buttress their economy – declining demand in the US and Europe forces them to Latin America – that’s Holland.

#### Exports are key to the economy – 22% of the state budget relies on the export engine which fuels every other source of growth – that’s Holland – downturn collapses the CCP’s hold on power which causes nuclear lashout and global draw-in. That outweighs on magnitude. CCP irrationality and the perceptive nature of the internal link mean we win timeframe: you can only die once.

The decline of the Chinese export engine turns the case – it accelerates economic instability and takes away the backstop of all CCP capabilities which makes internal reforms effective. Desperate attempts to hold on to Chinese capitalist success magnify environmental deterioration which is being addressed now via government wealth which is dependent on the state budget, 70% of which is export ased. A desperate China would require regional containment which increases the probability of adventurism going nuclear – turns nuclear testing and forces escalation. They have to win an impact that’s coming now that a nuclear capability can credibly deter and there isn’t one because deterrence relies on state rationality.

Case can’t turn the DA because they weaken China which logically increases the probability of instability, especially because their internal link is based on pollution which is obviously high now – disproves 1AC impact causality.

### 2NC – Link overview (0:55)

#### Latin American imports are finite and carefully calibrated to play to the strengths of a variety of trade partners. The aff swings the pendulum away from China, decreasing their exports to Latin America and hurting their economy – that’s Holland.

#### Their “not zero sum” arguments don’t assume the nuance of the link – we agree that trade and relations are not zero sum, but the aff’s [relations/multilat] advantage proves they substantially bolster the US’s regional influence by overcoming decades of perceived colonial paternalism.

The plan is unique because it’s an offer on equal terms to Cuba, a government to whom we’ve traditionally been hostile – that creates the perception that the US is willing to reengage peacefully and signals momentum for lifting the embargo in the future which affects the calculations of Latin American “swing states.”

#### That signal of reconciliation shifts regional consumption patterns away from Chinese goods – that’s Ellis. Proximity incentivizes states to purchase from the US as long as they no longer fear American manipulation of their markets

Ben Ami 13 (Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister who now serves as Vice President of the Toledo International Center for Peace “Is the US Losing Latin America?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-new-nature-of-us-influence-in-latin-america-by-shlomo-ben-ami)

Gone are the days when military muscle and the politics of subversion could secure US influence – in Latin America or anywhere else. A world power today is one that can combine economic vigor and a popular culture with global outreach on the basis of shared interests. The US is better positioned than any other power in this respect, particularly when it comes to applying these advantages in its immediate vicinity.

#### Empirics prove that trade credibility, not net trade, is the determining factor in market choices – Latin America will gravitate towards the US regardless of actual market competition

Ellis 2011(R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1st Quarter, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60\_85-91\_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes for future access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as a development model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the general population.

### 2NC – Internal link biz

#### The aff collapses the Chinese economy – prefer our internal links:

a) We control thesis level uniqueness and empirics – China’s economy is strong now and growing despite [the lack of access to nickel]. That disproves the causality of their manufacturing internal link and proves there’s a massive timeframe for their Russia war impact. Pollution is high now and increasing –recent pictures of Shanghai went viral and China responded by setting new targets for renewables and urban cleanup which means even if they access some brink, it’s at best long term.

### 2NC – UQ

#### US engagement is low and influence in LA is fading- failure of convergence and growing influence of other countries, esp. China

Hakim 1/6

(Peter, InterAmerican Dialogue, 1/6/14, “The Future of Inter-American Relations”, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3475>, ddy)

In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, there emerged for a time what appeared to be a relatively wide agreement in the United States and much of Latin America regarding the direction hemispheric relations should take. The convergence focused on renewed efforts to achieve inter- American cooperation and integration along three axes—economic, political, and institutional. Most nations welcomed the 1990 proposal of President George H.W. Bush to build toward an integrated economic bloc, a hemisphere-wide trade area that would allow for the free flow of capital and goods among all the countries of the Americas. The new bloc, later named the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), was intended to improve the competitiveness of the hemisphere’s economies, and enable them to keep up with the economically integrated nations of the European Union and with Japan and the fast growing “tigers” of East Asia. The increasingly market-oriented Latin American economies had begun to unilaterally reduce their trade barriers, and saw the value of joining a regional free trade arrangement effectively led by the United States. Second, the idea that democracy was the only valid form of government was taking firm root across the Americas. Free and fair elections were widely accepted as the only legitimate way to secure power. By 1991, every country in Latin America except for Cuba could boast an elected government. Moreover, the hemisphere’s governments approved Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions requiring collective action to protect and strengthen democratic governance in all nations of the Americas. This commitment to collective responsibility was subsequently codified in 2001, when every country of the hemisphere (except Cuba) signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC). Third, the OAS was seen as providing the crucial institutional framework for regional governance and cooperation. It was supplemented in 1994 by the newly launched Summit of the Americas process, which was designed to regularly assemble the hemisphere’s heads of state. This three-pronged convergence, which represented more of an aspiration than a firm commitment from the governments, has mostly evaporated. Negotiations toward a hemispheric trade bloc were halted in 2005 after several years of limited progress, largely because the United States and Brazil could not find common ground on several key issues. The Democratic Charter has hardly ever been invoked, despite many notorious violations of democratic practice. And, after many setbacks, the OAS and Summit of the Americas are both weakened institutions. Today, there is a lack of anything near a consensus on hemispheric relations. Diminishing Ties Between Latin America and the United States The United States and Latin America have been drifting apart for a decade or more. Still, the United States remains the most important external economic presence in Latin America—even though it has been steadily losing ground to Europe and China, which is now the leading commercial partner of several Latin American countries. The United States is the first or second largest trade partner for nearly every country in the region. No other nation invests more in Latin America, transfers more technology, or is the source of more remittances and overseas aid (although the latter is focused mainly on public security and drug-related issues). While its relative economic significance will continue to diminish in the coming period, the United States will surely sustain a robust commercial and financial relationship with Latin America. U.S. political engagement in Latin America has suffered a faster decline. Washington no longer has much influence on most issues and decisions in the region, particularly in South America. U.S. capacity to shape the region’s agenda or affect specific decisions has diminished considerably—and its interest in doing so has shrunk as well. Washington has sharply reduced its involvement in conflict and crisis resolution in Latin America, both within or between countries. The Latin Americans themselves have taken on these tasks, often making use of new regional and sub-regional institutions in which neither the United States nor Canada participate. The United States today has no unifying vision or common approach to Latin America. U.S. policy is largely directed to Mexico and Central America, driven by geographical proximity, economic and demographic integration, and concerns about security and drug trafficking. Brazil—because of its size, economic potential, and regional and global influence—also commands U.S. attention. The two countries, however, have not identified any clear path toward a closer, more cooperative relationship, either political or economic. Diverging Trajectories in Latin America Economically, Latin America has divided itself into two blocs. One includes the eleven countries that have free trade agreements with the United States, virtually all of which are seeking even stronger U.S. commercial ties. The other bloc consists of the five members of Mercosur and two aspirants. Nearly all of them enjoy substantial economic relations with the United States, but few have shown much interest in developing more formal commercial ties. There is currently no overlap between the two blocs. Of twenty Latin American countries, only Haiti and Cuba belong to neither. Regional politics are even more divisive. Among Latin American countries, there is no agreement on (a) what norms have to be satisfied for a government to be considered democratic; (b) what should be viewed as a violation of democratic practice, to be corrected and possibly sanctioned; (c) how persistent violators should be dealt with; (d) who should be the judge of whether violations are taking place; and (e) what role the OAS should play in preventing, judging, and responding to violations. Other trends are also evident. Perhaps the most important is Brazil’s assumption of a more active and important regional leadership role, particularly in South America—although it does not yet appear fully comfortable in that role or certain of its objectives. Venezuela is in a transition. During the Chávez years, the Venezuelan government was time and again a disruptive force in inter-American relations. The new government of Nicolás Maduro remains hostile to the United States, but Venezuela’s significance in the post- Chávez era is in question. Latin American countries are diversifying and strengthening their ties outside the Western Hemisphere. China’s presence is expanding almost everywhere in Latin America, including countries that still do not officially recognize the Beijing government. Chinese trade, investment, and land purchases have all exploded in the last ten years, particularly in commodity exporting nations. It is reasonable to expect growing political influence in the region as well, even as the Chinese government has insisted on its only limited interest beyond economics and commerce. Looking Ahead The critical question, however, is not where inter-American relations stand today, but where they are headed in the coming decades. What follows are four possible scenarios for the evolution of hemispheric affairs. They should not be viewed as predictions. Indeed, the most likely outcome is probably some unexpected combination of several of the scenarios. Scenario I: The Drift Continues The most likely scenario is that inter-American relations remain on their present course. The United States continues gradually to disengage politically from most of the region. Economic relations expand with many countries, but the U.S. share of total trade and investments keeps falling as China and other extra-hemispheric nations increase their share. Reflecting evolving political forces, social changes, and national aspirations, hemispheric ties may become less structured and perhaps less coherent. Relations among the countries of Latin America could become more tense and divisive. For the United States, the scenario involves increasingly selective engagement, directed to specific issues, countries, and events—without much attention to developing a broader strategy for U.S. relations with Latin America. U.S. interest in issues of regional scope will continue to recede. U.S. engagement remains strong only in Mexico and Central America, but even there it will be less intrusive as the countries become more independent and assertive. Latin America’s foreign relations grow increasingly diverse as globalization opens up new opportunities and weakens hemispheric ties. Within Latin America, countries continue to diverge and disagree; in some cases their differences may intensify in the absence of a significant U.S. presence. The distancing of the United States and Latin America combined with the divisions within the region will likely continue to diminish the importance of the OAS and Summits of the Americas. Scenario II: A Return to the Pan-American Vision With Chávez gone, the anti-U.S. alliance, ALBA, loses what is left of its drive, direction, and determination. Venezuela faces deeper political and economic challenges and no longer has the money or unity to play much of international role. No effective replacement for Chávez and Venezuelan resources emerge, and what is left of extreme opposition to U.S. engagement in Latin America fades in importance. There is broad movement towards the center—regarding relations with the United States and political and economic issues generally. This shift may already be occurring in many countries and should lead to an easing of tension and division between Atlantic and Pacific nations, and between North and South American countries. Most Latin American countries increasingly adopt orthodox macroeconomic policies, their economies become more closely aligned, and they expand attention to issues of equality and social justice. The continued emergence and strengthening of the middle class helps to sustain a pragmatic centrism in most countries, and allows for an increasingly shared understanding of democratic principles and the rule of law. Mexico and Brazil recognize the value of closer bilateral ties and more regional and global cooperation. For its part, Brazil—whose differences with the United States have frustrated hemispheric economic integration efforts— becomes increasingly concerned about its long-term economic prospects. It recognizes the Mercosur trade bloc as mainly consisting of unstable, economically hobbled partners. Brazil is also painfully aware that other Latin American nations (Peru, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico) show greater dynamism and brighter economic futures than the Mercosur group. If U.S. negotiations with Europe and Asia are successful in creating new trade agreements, Brazil knows that its global competitiveness will shrink further. Meanwhile, its expanding middle class presses for faster growth and improved government performance. All of these factors should push Brazil toward greater economic pragmatism and openness, and toward stronger commercial ties with the United States and the higher performing Latin American nations. The appeal of the Pan-American vision increases as the United States decisively emerges from slow growth and high unemployment, and manages to overcome its current political hyper-polarization. A more prosperous and unified U.S. modifies policies that have long caused friction with Latin America in the past, including Washington’s approaches to drugs, immigration, and Cuba. The United States is viewed as a more responsible and more respectful neighbor. In this scenario, hemispheric economic cooperation becomes more viable, perhaps opening the way for resumed negotiations toward a hemispheric free trade arrangement. The OAS takes on a more forceful role in regional affairs, and progress toward economic integration allows enhanced political cooperation. Scenario III: Latin American Solidarity Exactly as in the previous scenario, a broad movement towards the center leads to improved relations among Latin American nations. Most Latin American governments pursue similar economic and social policies, solid (not spectacular) growth rates are attained across the region, middle classes the future of inter-American relations continue to expand, and a shared understanding of democratic practice emerges. The left and right extremes are rarely able to win elections. Latin America’s two giants, Mexico and Brazil, recognize the value of closer economic ties, and greater international coordination. During this period of Latin American convergence around centrist politics and economics, the United States remains unable to regain an adequate trajectory of economic growth, the country’s politics remain dysfunctional, and it finds itself overextended internationally. After conservative triumphs in presidential and congressional elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020, immigration legislation becomes more restrictive and exclusionary, harsher sanctions are imposed on a post-Castro Cuba, and U.S. policy in Latin America focuses mostly on drug and security issues and trade disputes. Under this scenario, political and diplomatic relations remain cordial but the United States’ importance in the region declines sharply. The United States no longer plays a major role in regional affairs. Conflicts between countries or crises within them are addressed by Latin American governments. The United States remains an important economic partner for many nations in Latin America, although a weak U.S. economy leads Latin America to focus increasing attention on other trade partners and investors. The OAS and Summits lose most of their role in hemispheric affairs. Latin American institutions take on many of their responsibilities. Scenario IV: A Hostile Relationship There remains a possibility that Latin American nations could become increasingly hostile or antagonistic toward the United States. Some variant of the anti-U.S. sentiment promoted by Hugo Chávez could take hold in a significant number of countries in the region. Developments in the United States would be the same as those outlined in the previous scenario—a continuing U.S. economic slump combined with highly polarized politics and increasingly isolationist foreign policies. At the same time, Venezuela and Argentina unexpectedly rebound from their economic setbacks, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner takes firm control of Argentina politics, and Maduro or a Chavista successor does the same in Venezuela. Brazil and Mexico, along with several other countries, enter a period of slow or zero growth again, leaving both their low-income populations and what had been expanding middle classes vulnerable and frustrated. Populist, authoritarian leaders win elections in many countries. Although extensive economic ties remain in place, neither the United States nor Latin America retains much interest in collaborating with the other. Regional organizations, like the OAS and the Summits of the Americas become moribund, if they survive at all. Some Final Observations Interestingly, of the four scenarios, only the last (by far, the least likely) would necessarily be damaging to long-term U.S. interests, and probably to Latin American interests as well. The Pan-American scenario (Scenario II) is most appealing—in part because we are long accustomed to hearing it portrayed as an ideal model for inter-American relations, but also because it would likely lead to most productive outcomes for both the United States and most countries of the region. But the factors responsible for the already attenuated U.S.-Latin American relationship may have sunk any prospects of a return to the Pan-American framework, at least anytime soon. Since neither the United States nor the countries of the region seem willing to do very much at this point to rebuild vibrant, collaborative relations the best that is hoped is a continuation of some form of selective engagement (see Scenario I). This allows for countries, including the United States, to choose the partners and allies with which it wants to work, and establish appropriate distance from others. It does mean, however, that there will be only limited commitment to any common set of norms or hemispheric institutions. Latin American solidarity (Scenario III) should not be considered a particularly intolerable outcome, particularly if it leads to improved and more constructive relations among the countries of Latin America, and enables them to develop joint approaches to critical domestic, regional, and international issues and needed institutional arrangements to put them into practice. The United States and Latin America might even benefit from a period of disengagement—rather than trying to sustain what has increasingly become, at least for most countries, a largely empty rhetoric of partnership and community.

## AT Russia-China War High lighted

**No risk of Sino-Russian escalation**

**Chicago Tribune**, 10/15/**04**

China and Russia settled the last of their decades-old border disputes Thursday during a visit to Beijing by President Vladimir Putin, signing an agreement fixing their 2,700-mile-long border for the first time. The struggle over border areas resulted in violent clashes in the 1960s and 1970s, when strained Sino-Soviet relations were at their most acrimonious, feeding fears abroad that the conflict could erupt into nuclear war. Beijing and Moscow had reached agreements on individual border sections as relations warmed in the past decade. But a stretch of river and islands along China's northeastern border with Russia's Far East had remained in dispute.

**Fear of escalation deters Russia-China conflict**

Tom **Moriarty**, military intelligence analyst for the U.S. Air Force. 9/22/**04**, World Affairs

However, the Soviet Union ultimately chose to forgo a preemptive attack and attempted to defuse tensions through diplomatic channels. Numerous reasons led Soviet leaders to decide against preemptive attack. The main reason was the Soviet Union's fear that even if they could destroy all of China's nuclear weapons capability (which, in itself, was a big assumption), they feared a conventional attack by China. Like the United States during the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviet Union understood that they would lose the ability to prevent the crisis from escalating into a full-blown war. Soviet leaders grew concerned that China would respond with a prolonged people's war against the Soviet Union. Knowing that a prolonged war against a country with more than one billion people and a proven resiliency would exhaust the Soviet Union and would require forces to be withdrawn from Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders chose to ignore the Chinese provocations and let the confrontation defuse naturally. (12)

**Terrorists can’t get or use bioweapons—that’s Leitenberg. They lack all the core factors—obtaining pathogens, amplification, protecting them from the environment, and a spreading method. These are factors that took hundreds of Soviet and US scientists years to figure out. Their evidence is based on flawed assumptions—policy makers misstate facts about bioterror**

**And, prefer our evidence—scientific barriers are overlooked in order to exaggerate the threat**

**Leitenberg, IR prof, 5—**Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles)

The evolution of nonstate/terrorist biological weapon capabilities. The production and distribution of a dry powder anthrax product in the United States in 2001 is the most signiﬁcant event. However, understanding to what degree that demonstration of competence is relevant to “traditional” terrorist groups is impossible until the perpetrator(s) of the anthrax events are identiﬁed. If it was done with assistance, materials, knowledge, access, etc., derived from the U.S. biodefense program, the implications change entirely. The Rajneesh group (1984) succeeded in culturing Salmonella. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group failed to obtain, produce, or disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin. The steps taken by the al-Qaida group in efforts to develop a BW program were more advanced than the United States understood prior to its occupation of Afghanistan in November-December 2001. Nevertheless, publicly available information, including the somewhat ambiguous details that appeared in the March 31, 2005, report of the Commission on Intelligence Capabilities, indicates that the group failed to obtain and work with pathogens. Should additional information become available regarding the extent to which the al-Qaida BW effort had progressed, that assessment might have to be changed. Scenarios for national BW exercises that posit various BW agents in advanced states of preparation in the hands of terrorist groups simply disregard the requirements in knowledge and practice that such groups would need in order to work with pathogens. Unfortunately, 10 years of widely broadcast public discussion has provided such groups, at least on a general level, with suggestions as to what paths to follow. If and when a nonstate terrorist group does successfully reach the stage of working with pathogens, there is every reason to believe that it will involve classical agents, without any molecular genetic modiﬁcations. Preparing a dry powder preparation is likely to prove difficult, and dispersion to produce mass casualties equally so. Making predictions on the basis of what competent professionals may find “easy to do” has been a common error and continues to be so. The utilization of molecular genetic technology by such groups is still further off in time. No serious military threat assessment imputes to opponents capabilities that they do not have. There is no justiﬁcation for imputing to real world terrorist groups capabilities in the biological sciences that they do not posess.

• Framing “the threat” and setting the agenda of public perceptions and policy prescriptions. For the past decade the risk and immanence of the use of biological agents by nonstate actors/terrorist organizations—“bioterrorism”—has been systematically and deliberately exaggerated. It became more so after the combination of the 9/11 events and the October- November 2001 anthrax distribution in the United States that 89 followed immediately afterwards. U.S. Government officials worked hard to spread their view to other countries. An edifice of institutes, programs, conferences, and publicists has grown up which continue the exaggeration and scare-mongering. In the last year or two, the drumbeat had picked up. It may however become moderated by the more realistic assessment of the likelihood of the onset of a natural flu pandemic, and the accompanying realization that the U.S. Government has been using the overwhelming proportion of its relevant resources to prepare for the wrong contingency.

**And, dispersion is impossible**

**Newhouse, CDI Senior Fellow, 2 –** senior fellow at the Center for Defense Information. Former senior policy advisor on European Affairs to secretary of state. Former director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (John, World Policy Journal 7/31 V.XIX; N.2 p. 21)

Temperature, sunlight, wind, and moisture can all prevent effective delivery of chemical weapons. Biological pathogens are living organisms and thus more fragile than chemical agents. Chlorine in the water supply can kill them. Munitions can as easily vaporize an agent as dispense one. If released from a bomb or warhead, explosive effects would destroy all but 1-2 percent of the agent. 31

**Using bioweapons requires too much expertise that terrorists can’t obtain**

**CSIS 3—** Canadian Security Intelligence Services (Canadian Security Intelligence Services, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/miscdocs/purv\_e.html)

Mengel believes that the task would likely be beyond the capabilities of any single individual: would take a highly trained individual with experience in microbiology, pathology, aerosol physics, aerobiology, and even meteorology to make a reasonable attempt at manufacture and employment of a biological agent. Thus, although it is possible for one individual to undertake this type of technology, it is highly unlikely that this will occur. A larger group of at least three to five members with a full range of capabilities, including training, tactics, technical knowledge, resources, and operational experience, is considered the optimal number required to perpetrate an act using biological technologies. (1976: 456)13 Mengel's views are apparently shared by Root-Bernstein, who writes: "It takes unusual learning to employ bioterrorism. Time, place, and opportunity must coincide. So far, terrorist organizations have apparently lacked the sophisticated knowledge and training to plan and carry out biological terrorism. People with advanced degrees in microbiology, medicine, pharmacology, and agricultural science seem to be rare if not nonexistent among the membership of identified terrorist groups" (1991: 50).

**The impact ignores science—its propaganda for funding**

**Novak, MA in science, 98—**masters degree in science at the University of Arizona (Gary, The Biology, http://www.nov55.com/biow.html, AMiles)

The public is being propagandized on biological weapons, because some persons in the dark cellars of government are trying to get public support for an anti-terrorist campaign including increased police powers.

Journalists and bureaucrats run wild with their imaginations, because they do not have a clue as to the biology of the subject.

The reason why the diseases in question are not significant biological weapons is because they cannot be gotten into humans in significant quantities. The question is environmental conditions and delivery systems.

Diseases are so specialized and demanding in their requirements that they will not do something beyond which they normally do. Therefore, the whole concept of bioweapons is unrealistic—that is, as military style weapons. However, militaries are researching contagious diseases, which is where the real problem is.

## 2NC No Extinction

**No extinction—that’s O’Neill. A political science professor gathered all relevant evidence and concluded that that bioweapons pose no risk to humankind—they aren’t even WMDs, they are weapons of minimum destruction. Empirically proven by multiple past attempts and failures—the most widespread attack injured a few but killed none**

**And, even bio-engineered diseases can’t cause extinction**

**Space.com 1** (10/30, Survival of the Elitist: Bioterrorism May Spur Space Colonies, http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/generalscience/colonize\_now\_011030-2.html, AG)

Many scientists argue that there is no need to worry about the mortality of civilization right now. Eric Croddy is an expert on chemical and biological weapons at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Croddy said the threat of a virus wiping out the entire human species is simply not real. Even the most horrific virus outbreak in history, the 1918 Spanish Flu epidemic that killed between 20 million and 40 million people, including hundreds of thousands in the United States, eventually stopped. Experts say new strains of the influenza virus emerge every few decades and catch the human immune system unprepared, but prevention measures and ever-evolving medical treatments overcome the outbreaks. "I'd be much more concerned about an asteroid hitting the planet," Croddy said.

**And, their evidence assumes worst case scenarios—they have to provide evidence that all the conditions would be right**

**Leitenberg, IR prof, 5—**Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles)

A 2003 report for the Century Foundation nevertheless noted, that the 2001 “Amerithrax” events demonstrated that “. . . bioterrorism could have an uncertain, far reaching, and potentially devastating impact.”42 The statement that the release of a biological pathogen by a terrorist group should be considered as an occurrence of “low probability but high impact” is correct, but only with important qualifications. It does not mean any release of any agent formulation under any circumstances. Rather, it presumes the release of a very high quality product, efficiently distributed under optimum conditions. Later sections of this monograph return to this question in more detail.

**The impact isn’t based on science**

**Leitenberg, IR prof, 5—**Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies at U Maryland. Held two Visiting Professorships, at Cornell University and at the Paterson Graduate School of International Studies, Carleton University, in Ottawa, Canada (Milton, Assessing the Biological Weapons And Bioterrorism Threat, December 2005, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing\_bw\_threat.pdf, AMiles)

A threat assessment of the potential for the use of biological agents by terrorist groups is a very different exercise than that customarily faced in providing military threat assessments. No one ever did a threat assessment of a Soviet T-34 tank, the Galosh antiballistic missile (ABM) system that encircled Moscow, or an Akula-class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) without those systems actually existing. Declassifi cation of historical intelligence estimates of the capabilities of forces and weapon systems that U.S. forces might have confronted have certainly provided examples of inaccurate evaluations.44 Nevertheless, performance characteristics and capabilities were often reasonably well known. Threat estimation of potential bioterrorism is as different as possibly can be from the assessment of a real operational system. It is almost purely hypothetical, and rarely, if ever, is predicated on a specific identifiable group and its capabilities. The range of possible assumptions is enormous, the utilization of extreme worst-case assumptions is the rule, and these universally depend on the projection of capabilities into the future, rather than their existence at the present time.

**Terrorists don’t want bioweapons**

**Cohen, epidemiology prof, 2** – Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Social Medicine, Albert Einstein College of Medicine (Hillel, Physicians for Social Responsibility, http://www.thedoctorwillseeyounow.com/articles/other/biotb\_13/index.shtml)

Biological and chemical weapons of the kind and amounts that could cause catastrophic casualties are extremely difficult to obtain and still harder to deploy. Only countries with nuclear weapons capability and a relatively few others with large military establishments have had that capacity. It has been suggested that political terrorists would not be motivated to use catastrophic weaponry since such actions would bring universal condemnation even from those who might otherwise sympathize with their cause. Even if so motivated, it would be difficult for terrorist organizations, working in secret and without government support, to develop capacities that only a limited number of states have had the resources to acquire. Any government's putative desire to allow allied political organizations access to such weaponry would be constrained by reasonable fears of retaliation from targeted states in possession of robust military power.13,14,15

**Disease can’t cause extinction**

**Posner, law prof, 5**—Senior Lecturer, U Chicago Law. Judge on the US Court of Appeals 7th Circuit. AB from Yale and LLB from Harvard. (Richard, Catastrophe, http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi\_0199-4150331/Catastrophe-the-dozen-most-significant.html, AG)

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease.

**And, at worst a new pandemic will kill 40 million**

**WHO 9** World Health Organization 2009 (“Epidemic and Pandemic Alert and Response (EPR)”) KM

Potential consequences In the past, influenza pandemics have resulted in increased death and disease and great social disruption. In the 20th century, the most severe influenza pandemic occurred in 1918-1919 and caused an estimated 40 to 50 million deaths world wide. Current epidemiological models project that a pandemic could result in two to 7.4 million deaths globally. If an influenza pandemic were to occur today, we could expect the virus to spread rapidly due to the interconnected nature of the world and the high level of global travel. If the pandemic evolved to become severe and widespread over time, we could also expect: vaccines, antiviral agents and antibiotics to treat secondary infections to be in high demand, and potentially in short supply; medical facilities to be strained with demands to care for both influenza and non-influenza patients; potentially significant shortages of personnel to provide essential community services. Effective pandemic preparedness around the world is essential to mitigate the effects of a pandemic, particularly if it becomes severe.

# 1NR

#### US engagement is low and influence in LA is fading- failure of convergence and growing influence of other countries, esp. China

Hakim 1/6

(Peter, InterAmerican Dialogue, 1/6/14, “The Future of Inter-American Relations”, <http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3475>, ddy)

In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, there emerged for a time what appeared to be a relatively wide agreement in the United States and much of Latin America regarding the direction hemispheric relations should take. The convergence focused on renewed efforts to achieve inter- American cooperation and integration along three axes—economic, political, and institutional. Most nations welcomed the 1990 proposal of President George H.W. Bush to build toward an integrated economic bloc, a hemisphere-wide trade area that would allow for the free flow of capital and goods among all the countries of the Americas. The new bloc, later named the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), was intended to improve the competitiveness of the hemisphere’s economies, and enable them to keep up with the economically integrated nations of the European Union and with Japan and the fast growing “tigers” of East Asia. The increasingly market-oriented Latin American economies had begun to unilaterally reduce their trade barriers, and saw the value of joining a regional free trade arrangement effectively led by the United States. Second, the idea that democracy was the only valid form of government was taking firm root across the Americas. Free and fair elections were widely accepted as the only legitimate way to secure power. By 1991, every country in Latin America except for Cuba could boast an elected government. Moreover, the hemisphere’s governments approved Organization of American States (OAS) resolutions requiring collective action to protect and strengthen democratic governance in all nations of the Americas. This commitment to collective responsibility was subsequently codified in 2001, when every country of the hemisphere (except Cuba) signed the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC). Third, the OAS was seen as providing the crucial institutional framework for regional governance and cooperation. It was supplemented in 1994 by the newly launched Summit of the Americas process, which was designed to regularly assemble the hemisphere’s heads of state. This three-pronged convergence, which represented more of an aspiration than a firm commitment from the governments, has mostly evaporated. Negotiations toward a hemispheric trade bloc were halted in 2005 after several years of limited progress, largely because the United States and Brazil could not find common ground on several key issues. The Democratic Charter has hardly ever been invoked, despite many notorious violations of democratic practice. And, after many setbacks, the OAS and Summit of the Americas are both weakened institutions. Today, there is a lack of anything near a consensus on hemispheric relations. Diminishing Ties Between Latin America and the United States The United States and Latin America have been drifting apart for a decade or more. Still, the United States remains the most important external economic presence in Latin America—even though it has been steadily losing ground to Europe and China, which is now the leading commercial partner of several Latin American countries. The United States is the first or second largest trade partner for nearly every country in the region. No other nation invests more in Latin America, transfers more technology, or is the source of more remittances and overseas aid (although the latter is focused mainly on public security and drug-related issues). While its relative economic significance will continue to diminish in the coming period, the United States will surely sustain a robust commercial and financial relationship with Latin America. U.S. political engagement in Latin America has suffered a faster decline. Washington no longer has much influence on most issues and decisions in the region, particularly in South America. U.S. capacity to shape the region’s agenda or affect specific decisions has diminished considerably—and its interest in doing so has shrunk as well. Washington has sharply reduced its involvement in conflict and crisis resolution in Latin America, both within or between countries. The Latin Americans themselves have taken on these tasks, often making use of new regional and sub-regional institutions in which neither the United States nor Canada participate. The United States today has no unifying vision or common approach to Latin America. U.S. policy is largely directed to Mexico and Central America, driven by geographical proximity, economic and demographic integration, and concerns about security and drug trafficking. Brazil—because of its size, economic potential, and regional and global influence—also commands U.S. attention. The two countries, however, have not identified any clear path toward a closer, more cooperative relationship, either political or economic. Diverging Trajectories in Latin America Economically, Latin America has divided itself into two blocs. One includes the eleven countries that have free trade agreements with the United States, virtually all of which are seeking even stronger U.S. commercial ties. The other bloc consists of the five members of Mercosur and two aspirants. Nearly all of them enjoy substantial economic relations with the United States, but few have shown much interest in developing more formal commercial ties. There is currently no overlap between the two blocs. Of twenty Latin American countries, only Haiti and Cuba belong to neither. Regional politics are even more divisive. Among Latin American countries, there is no agreement on (a) what norms have to be satisfied for a government to be considered democratic; (b) what should be viewed as a violation of democratic practice, to be corrected and possibly sanctioned; (c) how persistent violators should be dealt with; (d) who should be the judge of whether violations are taking place; and (e) what role the OAS should play in preventing, judging, and responding to violations. Other trends are also evident. Perhaps the most important is Brazil’s assumption of a more active and important regional leadership role, particularly in South America—although it does not yet appear fully comfortable in that role or certain of its objectives. Venezuela is in a transition. During the Chávez years, the Venezuelan government was time and again a disruptive force in inter-American relations. The new government of Nicolás Maduro remains hostile to the United States, but Venezuela’s significance in the post- Chávez era is in question. Latin American countries are diversifying and strengthening their ties outside the Western Hemisphere. China’s presence is expanding almost everywhere in Latin America, including countries that still do not officially recognize the Beijing government. Chinese trade, investment, and land purchases have all exploded in the last ten years, particularly in commodity exporting nations. It is reasonable to expect growing political influence in the region as well, even as the Chinese government has insisted on its only limited interest beyond economics and commerce. Looking Ahead The critical question, however, is not where inter-American relations stand today, but where they are headed in the coming decades. What follows are four possible scenarios for the evolution of hemispheric affairs. They should not be viewed as predictions. Indeed, the most likely outcome is probably some unexpected combination of several of the scenarios. Scenario I: The Drift Continues The most likely scenario is that inter-American relations remain on their present course. The United States continues gradually to disengage politically from most of the region. Economic relations expand with many countries, but the U.S. share of total trade and investments keeps falling as China and other extra-hemispheric nations increase their share. Reflecting evolving political forces, social changes, and national aspirations, hemispheric ties may become less structured and perhaps less coherent. Relations among the countries of Latin America could become more tense and divisive. For the United States, the scenario involves increasingly selective engagement, directed to specific issues, countries, and events—without much attention to developing a broader strategy for U.S. relations with Latin America. U.S. interest in issues of regional scope will continue to recede. U.S. engagement remains strong only in Mexico and Central America, but even there it will be less intrusive as the countries become more independent and assertive. Latin America’s foreign relations grow increasingly diverse as globalization opens up new opportunities and weakens hemispheric ties. Within Latin America, countries continue to diverge and disagree; in some cases their differences may intensify in the absence of a significant U.S. presence. The distancing of the United States and Latin America combined with the divisions within the region will likely continue to diminish the importance of the OAS and Summits of the Americas. Scenario II: A Return to the Pan-American Vision With Chávez gone, the anti-U.S. alliance, ALBA, loses what is left of its drive, direction, and determination. Venezuela faces deeper political and economic challenges and no longer has the money or unity to play much of international role. No effective replacement for Chávez and Venezuelan resources emerge, and what is left of extreme opposition to U.S. engagement in Latin America fades in importance. There is broad movement towards the center—regarding relations with the United States and political and economic issues generally. This shift may already be occurring in many countries and should lead to an easing of tension and division between Atlantic and Pacific nations, and between North and South American countries. Most Latin American countries increasingly adopt orthodox macroeconomic policies, their economies become more closely aligned, and they expand attention to issues of equality and social justice. The continued emergence and strengthening of the middle class helps to sustain a pragmatic centrism in most countries, and allows for an increasingly shared understanding of democratic principles and the rule of law. Mexico and Brazil recognize the value of closer bilateral ties and more regional and global cooperation. For its part, Brazil—whose differences with the United States have frustrated hemispheric economic integration efforts— becomes increasingly concerned about its long-term economic prospects. It recognizes the Mercosur trade bloc as mainly consisting of unstable, economically hobbled partners. Brazil is also painfully aware that other Latin American nations (Peru, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico) show greater dynamism and brighter economic futures than the Mercosur group. If U.S. negotiations with Europe and Asia are successful in creating new trade agreements, Brazil knows that its global competitiveness will shrink further. Meanwhile, its expanding middle class presses for faster growth and improved government performance. All of these factors should push Brazil toward greater economic pragmatism and openness, and toward stronger commercial ties with the United States and the higher performing Latin American nations. The appeal of the Pan-American vision increases as the United States decisively emerges from slow growth and high unemployment, and manages to overcome its current political hyper-polarization. A more prosperous and unified U.S. modifies policies that have long caused friction with Latin America in the past, including Washington’s approaches to drugs, immigration, and Cuba. The United States is viewed as a more responsible and more respectful neighbor. In this scenario, hemispheric economic cooperation becomes more viable, perhaps opening the way for resumed negotiations toward a hemispheric free trade arrangement. The OAS takes on a more forceful role in regional affairs, and progress toward economic integration allows enhanced political cooperation. Scenario III: Latin American Solidarity Exactly as in the previous scenario, a broad movement towards the center leads to improved relations among Latin American nations. Most Latin American governments pursue similar economic and social policies, solid (not spectacular) growth rates are attained across the region, middle classes the future of inter-American relations continue to expand, and a shared understanding of democratic practice emerges. The left and right extremes are rarely able to win elections. Latin America’s two giants, Mexico and Brazil, recognize the value of closer economic ties, and greater international coordination. During this period of Latin American convergence around centrist politics and economics, the United States remains unable to regain an adequate trajectory of economic growth, the country’s politics remain dysfunctional, and it finds itself overextended internationally. After conservative triumphs in presidential and congressional elections in 2016, 2018, and 2020, immigration legislation becomes more restrictive and exclusionary, harsher sanctions are imposed on a post-Castro Cuba, and U.S. policy in Latin America focuses mostly on drug and security issues and trade disputes. Under this scenario, political and diplomatic relations remain cordial but the United States’ importance in the region declines sharply. The United States no longer plays a major role in regional affairs. Conflicts between countries or crises within them are addressed by Latin American governments. The United States remains an important economic partner for many nations in Latin America, although a weak U.S. economy leads Latin America to focus increasing attention on other trade partners and investors. The OAS and Summits lose most of their role in hemispheric affairs. Latin American institutions take on many of their responsibilities. Scenario IV: A Hostile Relationship There remains a possibility that Latin American nations could become increasingly hostile or antagonistic toward the United States. Some variant of the anti-U.S. sentiment promoted by Hugo Chávez could take hold in a significant number of countries in the region. Developments in the United States would be the same as those outlined in the previous scenario—a continuing U.S. economic slump combined with highly polarized politics and increasingly isolationist foreign policies. At the same time, Venezuela and Argentina unexpectedly rebound from their economic setbacks, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner takes firm control of Argentina politics, and Maduro or a Chavista successor does the same in Venezuela. Brazil and Mexico, along with several other countries, enter a period of slow or zero growth again, leaving both their low-income populations and what had been expanding middle classes vulnerable and frustrated. Populist, authoritarian leaders win elections in many countries. Although extensive economic ties remain in place, neither the United States nor Latin America retains much interest in collaborating with the other. Regional organizations, like the OAS and the Summits of the Americas become moribund, if they survive at all. Some Final Observations Interestingly, of the four scenarios, only the last (by far, the least likely) would necessarily be damaging to long-term U.S. interests, and probably to Latin American interests as well. The Pan-American scenario (Scenario II) is most appealing—in part because we are long accustomed to hearing it portrayed as an ideal model for inter-American relations, but also because it would likely lead to most productive outcomes for both the United States and most countries of the region. But the factors responsible for the already attenuated U.S.-Latin American relationship may have sunk any prospects of a return to the Pan-American framework, at least anytime soon. Since neither the United States nor the countries of the region seem willing to do very much at this point to rebuild vibrant, collaborative relations the best that is hoped is a continuation of some form of selective engagement (see Scenario I). This allows for countries, including the United States, to choose the partners and allies with which it wants to work, and establish appropriate distance from others. It does mean, however, that there will be only limited commitment to any common set of norms or hemispheric institutions. Latin American solidarity (Scenario III) should not be considered a particularly intolerable outcome, particularly if it leads to improved and more constructive relations among the countries of Latin America, and enables them to develop joint approaches to critical domestic, regional, and international issues and needed institutional arrangements to put them into practice. The United States and Latin America might even benefit from a period of disengagement—rather than trying to sustain what has increasingly become, at least for most countries, a largely empty rhetoric of partnership and community.